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The NCAA Rules Adoption,
Interpretation, Enforcement, and
Infractions Processes: The Laws That
Regulate Them and the Nature of
Court Review
Josephine (Jo)R. Potuto*
ABSTRACT

This article takes a comprehensive look at how the NCAA is
organized, describes the NCAA committee structure, and explains how
the NCAA in its multitude of roles does its work. The article focuses
particularly on the NCAA bylaw interpretation process and the
policies, procedures, and scope of authority of the enforcement,
infractions, and student-athlete reinstatement processes.
In its
description of the division of responsibility among enforcement,
infractions and student-athlete reinstatement, the article emphasizes
the independence of each. The article then assesses the functions and
structure of the NCAA in light of the preogatives of a private, multistate association and the legal framework that informs its operation primarily agency law, administrative law, constitutional law, and
contract law.
The article concludes that the NCAA governance
structure is about as well conceived to achieve the goals of its members
as is possible in an imperfect world.

Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto is the Richard H. Larson Professor of Constitutional Law at
the University of Nebraska College of Law. She is the university's faculty athletics
representative (FAR), a required campus position at all National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) member institutions. Potuto served nine years as a member of the Committee on
Infractions (COI) (two years as a Chair), more than four years on the Division I Management
Council, including service on both its Legislative Review and Administrative Review
Subcommittees, and as a member of the the NCAA Special Review Committee that evaluated
and made operational a special consultant's report on enforcement and infractions. While her
experience informs the views expressed in this Article, the author does not speak for the
Management Council, the CO, or any other NCAA committee.
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The National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) is a
private association of four-year post-high-school educational
institutions that derives its authority from the member institutions
that created it.' The NCAA is one of the most talked about and widely
known private associations. In fundamental ways, though, it is also
the least understood. This Article describes how NCAA Division I
(Division 1)2 operates in its roles as legislator, interpreter, enforcer,
and arbitrator of college athletics, and analyzes the legal framework
that authorizes and informs its performance of these roles.

1.
NCAA CONST. art. 4.02.1, available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/
PDF/D 1_Manual9d74aOb2-d10d-4587-8902-bOc78 le 128ae.pdf.
2.
Division I institutions include the largest and best-funded research universities.
They must comply with the Division I philosophy statement and all applicable criteria. NCAA
CONST. art. 3.2.1; NCAA BYLAWS art. 20.9. They must sponsor thirteen sports for which the
NCAA operates a post-season championship, NCAA BYLAWS art. 20.9.4, and for each of these
thirteen sports award at least 50 percent of the maximum number of grants-in-aid permitted,
NCAA BYLAWS art. 20.9.1.2. An athletics conference may be a member of the NCAA. NCAA
CONST. art. 3.02.3.3. It may be a member of Division I if at least 50 percent of its member
institutions meet Division I requirements. NCAA BYLAWS art. 20.1.2.
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THE NCAA: WHO?
In all but title, the NCAA is multiples of multiples. It is the
member institutions that have ultimate authority for what it does and
that are divided into three divisions (I, II, III) and further divided into
subdivisions within Division I.1
It is the national office, whose administrators guide, and
sometimes set, the substantive agenda; operate programs and
activities; and facilitate the work of the various boards, councils,
cabinets, and committees. It is the Division I Board of Directors (DI
Board of Directors), which is comprised of university presidents and
chancellors, and has final authority over all aspects of Division J.4 It is
the Division I Leadership and Legislative Councils 5 that review
national policy and have prime responsibility for the legislative
agenda. 6 It is the NCAA cabinets, which oversee areas of NCAA
responsibility such as championships, amateurism, and academic
standards. 7 It is the various NCAA committees. 8 These include the
Division I Men's Basketball Committee, 9 which administers the huge
and hugely profitable men's basketball championship tournament, as

3.
Division I institutions that sponsor football are either in the Football Championship
Subdivision (DI FCS) (until 2007 known as DI AA) and play in the NCAA football championship
or are in the Football Bowl Subdivision (DI FBS) (until 2007 known as DI A) and play in bowl
games. NCAA BYLAWS arts. 20.01.2, 20.1.1.2, 20.4.1.1. Division I institutions without football are
known, peculiarly, simply as Division I. DI FBS institutions must sponsor at least sixteen sports,
at least eight of which must be women's sports, NCAA BYLAWS art. 20.9.7.1, and, in general,
their football teams must play at least 60 percent of their games against other FBS teams and
average at least fifteen thousand in paid attendance computed every two years on a rolling basis,
NCAA BYLAWS art. 20.9.7.2. Their other teams must be in sports for which the NCAA has a postseason championship, NCAA BYLAWS art. 20.9.4, and meet minimum contest requirements,
NCAA BYLAWS art. 20.9.4.3. A DI FBS conference must have at least eight DI FBS institutions.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 20.02.6. The six equity conferences within DI FBS (Big 12, Big 10, Big East,
PAC-10, SEC, ACC) operate the Bowl Championship Series (BCS).
4.
NCAA CONST. arts. 4.01.1 (Structure), 4.2 (DI Board of Directors), 4.2.2 (Duties and
Responsibilities); see also NCAA CONST. fig. 4-1 (DI Governance Structure).
5.
NCAA CONST. arts. 4.5.2 (Leadership Council; Duties and Responsibilities), 4.6.2
(Legislative Council; Duties and Responsibilities).
6.
NCAA councils, as well as cabinets, and committees, are comprised of faculty,
administrators from member institutions, usually but not exclusively from athletics, and
administrators from athletics conferences. NCAA staff serve as liaisons; they are not members.
7.
NCAA BYLAWS arts. 21.7.5.1 (Academics Cabinet), 21.7.5.3 (Amateurism Cabinet),
21.7.5.5 (Championships/Sports Management Cabinet).
8.
NCAA CONST. art. 4.9 (Committees/Cabinets). See NCAA BYLAWS art. 21 for a
complete list of cabinets and committees and their areas of responsibility.
9.
NCAA BYLAWS arts. 21.7.5.5.3 (Committees with Championships Administration
and Sports Issues Responsibilities), 21.7.5.5.5.3.6 (Men's Basketball Committee), 31.1
(Administration of NCAA Championships).
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well as other committees that monitor team student-athlete academic
performance, initial and continuing eligibility of individual studentathletes, and the validation of academic records of prospective
student-athletes. 10 The Student-Athlete Reinstatement Committee
(Reinstatement Committee) handles reinstatement to eligibility of
student-athletes rendered ineligible by violations of NCAA rules.
The Division I Committee on Infractions (COI) hears and decides
cases of institutional responsibility for major violations. 12
Thus, to reference "the NCAA" as encompassing all boards,
councils, cabinets, and committees in all three divisions and
subdivisions, as well as national office staff, is to reach a level of
imprecision equivalent to citing "the government" as covering the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of federal and state
government. This imprecision fosters confusion about the NCAA and
how it conducts business-confusion that the media and the public
aggravate when they refer to "the NCAA" to mean only the Division I
Football Bowl Subdivision (DI FBS). In turn, discussion of the "DI
FBS" focuses predominantly on football and men's basketball. The
result is that the NCAA is often seen through the prism of two sports
3
that in fundamental ways are unrepresentative of college athletics.
Problems in these sports-whether widespread or sporadic, real,
exaggerated, or simply perceived-constitute a familiar list: bloated
coaches'
salaries,
undue
donor influence,
acceleration
of
commercialization, criticism that student-athletes are not really
students and/or that they are exploited, and overall perceptions that
college athletics is corrupting the academic missions and integrity of
colleges and universities.1 4 No doubt the DI FBS is a major player in
the NCAA; its central status in Division I is reflected in its voting

10.
NCAA BYLAWS arts. 14.1.2.1 (High School Review Committee), 14.1.2.2 (Student
Records Review Committee), 14.3.1.5 (Initial-Eligibility Waivers), 14.4.3.6 (Waivers of ProgressToward-Degree Rule), 23.1 (Committee on Academic Performance).
11.
NCAA BYLAWS arts. 14.11.1 (Obligation of Member Institution to Withhold StudentAthlete from Competition), 14.11.2 (Ineligibility Resulting from Recruiting Violation), 14.12
(Restoration of Eligibility).
12.
Major violations are all those violations not characterized as secondary. For a
definition of secondary violations, see infra text accompanying note 130.
13.
Football and men's basketball are revenue producing; college play is the prime path
to professional careers.
14.
See, e.g., Frank G. Splitt, Time for accountability in Sports: Corrupt Collegiate
Athletics Overshadow FalteringAcademic Mission, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Nov 14, 2008.
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priority on the DI Board of Directors and the Leadership and
Legislative Councils, 15 but it is not the whole enchilada.
THE NCAA: WHY?
Each institution is sole captain of its academic ship. It charts
its academic mission through admissions standards; majors and
degrees offered; standards for faculty hiring, promotion, and tenure;
and the constituencies it serves. Each institution is also in charge of
the rest of the ship's rigging, including campus life and student wellbeing. Competition among universities is a joint effort. The NCAA
exists to do what no institution can do on its own: administer
championships and regulate athletics competition so as to ensure a
level playing field. NCAA bylaws and policies cover a myriad of
substantive areas as well as competition rules and scheduling. They
even
cover
academic
matters-the
bedrock,
non-delegable
responsibility of each institution. There are compelling reasons why
this is so.
Off-Field Effects
NCAA policies and conduct by athletes off the field affect
competition on the field. Were there no rules prohibiting payment to
athletes, 16 well-heeled institutions would have a decided recruiting
17
advantage. Were there no rules restricting play and practice time,
coaches willing to require student-athletes to spend all waking hours
in athletics-related activities would have a competitive edge. Were
there no rules setting up an enforcement and infractions system to
find and punish cheaters, 18 unscrupulous coaches and staff would have
a field day.

15.
NCAA CONST. arts. 4.2.1 (Board of Directors; Composition), 4.5.1 (Leadership
Council; Composition), 4.6.1 (Legislative Council; Composition).
16.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 16.02.3 (Extra Benefit). An extra benefit is any special
arrangement by which a student- athlete, relative, or friend gets a benefit not authorized in
NCAA bylaws. Id. The extra benefit rule requires that student-athletes be treated in the same
way that students not athletes are treated. Id.
17.
See NCAA BYLAWS art. 17 for coverage of play/practice requirements. During the
season, a student-athlete is limited to four hours per day and twenty hours per week of
mandatory countable athletically related activities. NCAA BYLAWS art. 17.1.6.1 (Daily and
Weekly Hour Limitations - Playing Season). For the definition of countable activities, see NCAA
BYLAWS 17.02.1.
18.
Id. arts. 19 (Enforcement), 32 (Enforcement Policies and Procedures).
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Diversity, Commonality, and Academic Bylaws
There is great diversity among Division I institutions. They
are public and private, non-sectarian and religiously affiliated, large
land-grant universities and small liberal arts colleges. Some have big
budgets, influential alumni, and fat-cat donors. Others are urban
commuter colleges with small budgets and a mission to serve the
economically disadvantaged.
Some offer extensive graduate and
professional programs, others exclusively undergraduate education.
Despite their diversity, Division I institutions also share
certain characteristics and responsibilities that help to explain the
breadth of what the NCAA does. First, the institutional obligation to
abide by NCAA bylaws neither is nor can be an abdication of an
institution's ultimate responsibility to administer its athletic
program.1 9 Second, institutions can neither cede their responsibility
over things academic nor join an association perceived to discount
academics. Third, the NCAA is the "public face" of college athletics.
Because what it does-and what it is perceived to do-has impact at
home, institutions need an association identified with student-athlete
well-being 0 that upholds sportsmanship and ethical conduct. Finally,
whatever the differences between and among institutions, within each
there is common academic ground and a student population with
similarly situated academic profiles.
Scope and Nature of Academic Bylaws
Coaches are under great pressure to win, particularly in the
Division I FBS revenue-producing sports.
They are hired,
compensated, and fired based on their win-loss records. Because their
teams play under competition rules that are uniform across
institutions, coaches understandably want academic decisions
regarding admissions and competition eligibility to be decided the
same way.
In the face of institutional diversity, uniformity of
admissions and academic decisions can be achieved only by an
untenable prioritization of athletics over academic interests.
To achieve uniformity of admissions criteria, institutions could
differentiate between student-athletes and students who are not

19.
The first NCAA Principle is that an institution must control its athletics program.
NCAA CONST. art. 2.1. NCAA fundamental policy is that athletics competition must be part and
parcel of the educational system. Id. art. 1.3.1.
20.
Id. arts. 2.2-2.4 (Student-Athlete Well-Being, Gender Equity, and Sportsmanship
and Ethical Conduct), 2.6 (Nondiscrimination), 2.9 (Amateurism).
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athletes to admit the former under NCAA standards that at most
institutions are less rigorous than institutional ones. Admissions
criteria, although imperfect, are nonetheless predictors of future
academic performance. 21 In addition to fairness issues inherent in
wholesale differential admissions treatment, then, preferences preadmission may mean failures post-admission if student-athletes are
graded on standards applied even-handedly both to them and to
students not student-athletes. If, by contrast, academic standards are
ignored for student-athletes post-admission, then they may receive
passing grades for failing work,2 2 an exploitation of student-athletes
and a subversion of academic integrity as well.
A second alternative would have institutions use NCAA initial
eligibility standards in admissions decisions for students who are not
athletes as well as for student-athletes.
This alternative cedes
admissions standards to an outside entity-and an athletics one at
that-with the result that universities forfeit their core responsibility
23
for academic matters.
Institutional diversity and resource disparities make
uniformity across institutions difficult to achieve. Maintaining an
even playing field requires some level of uniformity in academic
requirements. The totality of NCAA bylaws is expected to leave
unfettered each institution's autonomy to delineate its academic
24
mission and yet, at the same time, also (1) uphold academic primacy,
(2) avoid giving a wholesale competitive edge to institutions that trade
core academic values for athletics success, and (3) assure that the
public face of college athletics signals neither disinterest in or, worse,
disdain for student-athlete academic well-being.
NCAA bylaws

21.
Wayne J. Camera & Gary Exhternacht, The SAT I and High School Grades: Utility
in
Predicting Success
in
College,
RES.
NOTES,
(July
2000),
available at
http: / /professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/pdf/rn1010755.pdf; see also. Why SAT,
SAT Website, http://sat.collegeboard.com/why-sat (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
22.
See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992). In four years at Creighton,
Ross, a basketball student- athlete, completed ninety-six credits of academic work with a D
average; many of these credits did not count toward the 128 required to graduate. Id. at 412.
Ross left Creighton with fourth grade language skills and seventh grade reading skills. Id. He
then took a year of remedial high school education at Creighton's expense. Id.
23.
Advocates for student-athlete admissions based on NCAA standards focus on what
now are minimum standards. Competition equity also could be achieved by raising NCAA
academic standards to equal those at institutions with high admission and degree-progress
requirements. This alternative also interferes with institutional academic autonomy, but this
time hits a different subset of member institutions. It also limits access to the economically and
culturally disadvantaged and to minorities historically under-represented in higher education.
See Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
24.
NCAA CONST. art. 2.5 (Sound Academic Standards).
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resolve these tensions imperfectly, but in the only way possible,
through the establishment of minimum academic standards for
admissions and progress-toward-degree. 2 These standards do not
displace institutional ones; the latter always trump. A student-athlete
inadmissible under institutional standards cannot attend that
institution no matter that she is academically eligible for NCAA
competition. A student-athlete academically ineligible for NCAA
competition but admissible under institutional standards may attend
26
that institution but may not compete.
SCOPE OF ARTICLE
This Article describes the Division I governance structure and
the law governing private associations in their adoption,
interpretation, enforcement, and adjudication of bylaws, practices, and
policies. Part I discusses the legal parameters that govern associations
such as the NCAA and the judicial deference accorded to their policies
and decisions. Part II describes the NCAA's bylaw interpretation
process by which the scope and meaning of bylaws are supplemented
through action of the Legislative Interpretation Committee and NCAA
staff. The focus of Part III is on the NCAA waiver process, which
tempers the bright-line operation of bylaws to respond to unusual
circumstances. Part IV returns to the law of private associations to
examine the opportunities of NCAA non-members, including studentathletes and staff at member institutions, to challenge NCAA policies
and decisions. Part V makes clear the specific functions and scope of
responsibility of the COT, the Reinstatement Committee, and NCAA
enforcement staff, whose work is the source of most litigation by nonmembers. Part VI concludes that the infractions, reinstatement, and
enforcement processes are about as well-conceived to achieve the goals
of NCAA member institutions as can be expected in an imperfect
world but also includes several recommendations designed to improve
implementation of these goals.

25.
For information as to what is required, see NCAA BYLAWS arts. 14.4.1 (ProgressToward-Degree Requirements) and 14.4.3 (Eligibility for Competition).
26.
For NCAA initial eligibility standards, see NCAA BYLAWS 14.3.1.1.2 (InitialEligibility Index).
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I. MULTISTATE ASSOCIATIONS AND DEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL
REVIEW
The NCAA is a private association. 27 It is big, national, the
28
focus of media and public attention, and scrutinized by legislators,
but nonetheless private. The significance of this fact is sometimes illunderstood in concept and is repeatedly misunderstood in its practical
consequences. Simply put, a private association, like a private actor,
is free to choose.
Private actors make choices from a panoply of available
options. Their choices are not displaced because society as a whole
believes (perhaps rightly) that other choices would be wiser or would
produce more efficient results. Party choice also is affected by
contract. Whether a simple, one-time interaction or a multi-layered,
long-term agreement, a contract is an exchange of promises by which
parties create mutual rights and duties, including how, under whose
law, 29 where,3 0 and by whom a contract is to be enforced. 31 Courts
apply contract terms consistent with party expectations. 32 They look
first to party intent to resolve ambiguous contract terms, then to the
course of party conduct, and, finally, to usages of the trade.3 3 Party

27.
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). Because it is a private actor, the NCAA is
not obliged to meet constitutional minimum due process standards. Even so, NCAA processes
would pass constitutional muster. See id.

28.
E.g., Hearing on Due Process and the NCAA Before the Subcomm. on the
Const. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 35-42 (2004), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/Legacy/95802.pdf, see also Senate Finance Committee
Hearing, December 5, 2006 (NCAA tax-exempt status); Top Grades Without the
Classes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2006 (describing House Ways and Means Committee
request for NCAA to justify its tax exemption consistent with its "cash-consuming,
win-at-all costs athletics departments"); Brad Wolverton & Paul Fain, Senate Hearing
Will Focus on Rising Tuition Costs and Potential Tax Abuses by Colleges, CHRON.
HIGHER ED., Nov. 17, 2006 (describing Senate Finance Committee Hearing on NCAA
Tax-Exempt Status).
29.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971); see, e.g., Pritchard v.
Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882); see generally, 2 ERNST RABEL, 2 THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 376-84 (1947).

30.

See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Scherk v. Alberto-

Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).

31.
See, e.g., E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am. , 531 U.S. 57
(2000); see generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
FARNSWORTH]. Courts follow contract terms unless bargaining was not at arms length, a claim
unavailable to association members. See id.
32.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 cmt. c (1981).
33.
The parties even may agree that contract terms be interpreted according to trade
association rules or by reference to the customs of a particular trade. See, e.g., London Assurance
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autonomy is not unbounded, however. Contracting parties may not
agree to commit crimes or torts, and contracts must comply with
federal or generally applicable state law, 34 as well as the public
35
policies of fair dealing and good faith.
Formal associations, such as the NCAA, are fundamentally big
contracts.36 They develop not by happenstance but by a purposeful
decision to pursue common goals collectively. The NCAA is a multisubject contract entered into by more than a thousand members (335
in Division I alone).37 NCAA members articulate the association's
purposes and decide how it will operate, who may join, the rules
governing what members are required to do, and the rules describing
what is prohibited. 38 NCAA members must follow rules and policies
collectively adopted; bylaws have direct impact only on them; and only
members can change, repeal, or request waivers from them. An
obligation of NCAA membership is that member institutions must
monitor the conduct of those for whom they are responsible and
sanction them for violations. In that way, staff members and studentathletes can be, and are, affected by NCAA bylaws. But the effect of
v. Companhia de Moagens do Barreiro, 167 U.S. 149 (1897); Boole v. Union Marine Ins. Co., 198
P. 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921).
34.
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 623 (1984). Generally applicable laws arise in a host of areas among them, nondiscrimination statutes, mandatory terms of employment such as minimum wages, maximum
interest rates that may be charged in time-purchase agreements, and restraints of trade. If a
particular NCAA bylaw operates as a restraint of trade under the federal antitrust laws, then a
member institution may sue the NCAA on this basis. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
85 (1984).
35.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205; Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine,
Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative
Study, 77 HARv. L. REV. 401 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205. For a case
involving the NCAA where a court made explicit that review of bylaws was limited to assuring
good faith and fair dealing, see Oliver v. NCAA, No. 2008 CV 762, 2009 WL 4827828, (Ohio Ct.
Com. P1. Feb. 2, 2009) (unpublished opinion). Courts have even upheld contract terms that
transgress the tenets of good faith and fair dealing when the result is anticipated in explicit
contract language. E.g., VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
36.
Alternatively, one may argue that the relationship between members of a private
association and the association that they create is not contractual. In that case, scrutiny of
provisions would be even more limited, restricted to assuring they were created according to
associational rules and enforced as defined in those rules.
37.
See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 590 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1979); Jorgensen
Realty, Inc. v. Box, 701 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Colo. App. 1985).
38.
The Supreme Court has stated clearly that a private association is the authoritative
voice on the meaning of its rules and policies and that neither legislature nor court may
substitute their judgment for that of the association. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 653. The Court will
look, however, to assure that an interpretation was not contrived to avoid what would otherwise
be the imposition of law. Id. at 656.
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the bylaws on them, no matter how dramatic, is achieved indirectly
through institutional enforcement.3 9
The totality of NCAA bylaws is akin to a legal system where
shared normative and cultural understandings cover a wide range of
subject areas with multi-varied and complex interrelationships.
NCAA conduct bylaws regulate what member institutions, through
staffs, boosters, and student-athletes, must, may, and may not do.
Conduct bylaws govern recruiting, academic eligibility to compete,
team academic performance, financial aid, awards and benefits,
competition and championships, play and practice limits, amateurism,
and commercialization.4 0 Other bylaws structure boards, councils,
cabinets, and committees. Still other bylaws vest committees with
responsibility to interpret and enforce conduct bylaws, grant waivers
from them, and sanction their violation ("conduct bylaw committees").
How and why the system works as it does is self-evident to those
within it, but it is sometimes anything but to those outside it.
One example is illustrative: a basketball prospect recruited by
Ohio State was ineligible for NCAA competition on two separate
grounds involving two different violations: (1) he had played on a
professional team4 1 and (2) Jim O'Brien, the then-head men's
basketball coach, had given him $6,000.42 Under NCAA bylaws,
ineligible students may request restoration of eligibility from the
Reinstatement Committee. Ignorant of the violation involving the
$6,000, Ohio State sought the player's reinstatement, focusing solely
on the bar to eligibility that his professional team play created. When
Ohio State learned about the $6,000 payment, it fired O'Brien. What

39.
See supra notes 4-12.
40.
NCAA BYLAWS arts. 12 (Commercialization and Amateurism), 13 (Recruiting), 14
(Eligibility: Academic and General Requirements), 15 (Financial Aid); 16 (Awards, Benefits and
Expenses for Enrolled Student-Athletes), 17 (Playing and Practice Seasons), 18 (Championships
and Postseason Football), 23 (Academic Performance Program).
41.
It was uncontroverted that when he received the money he already had signed a
contract, played on a professional team, and was paid by the team. NCAA BYLAWS art. 12.1.2. An
athlete loses amateur status when he or she
(a) Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that
sport; . . . (c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional
athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received; . . . (e)
Competes on any professional athletics.
Id.
42.
NCAA DI COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 256 (Mar. 10, 2006)
(The Ohio State University). O'Brien's claim, rejected by the COI, was that the $6,000 payment
was not a violation because the athlete already was ineligible. Id. Institutional staff and boosters
may not give cash to a prospect. NCAA BYLAWS art. 13.2.1 (Offers and Inducements).
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followed was an infractions case4 3 and also a breach of contract
44
lawsuit that O'Brien brought against Ohio State.
The trial judge read the employment contract between O'Brien
and Ohio State to mean that Ohio State anticipated retaining O'Brien
as head coach even if he committed a major violation bearing on
prospect eligibility and then failed to disclose what he had done at the
very time Ohio State pursued a reinstatement request for the
prospect. 4
Within college athletics, the way in which the judge
interpreted the employment contract between O'Brien and Ohio State
was inconceivable for an institution concerned about institutional
control and its standing within the NCAA and among member
institutions.
Of major significance to the application of contract principles to
the NCAA is that the association is multi-state. Although federal law
may intervene to revise or supplant party agreement (so long as the
agreement does not infringe on a constitutionally protected right such
as freedom of speech), state law may not be enforced against a multistate association unless the law also (1) is generally applicable, (2) is
not targeted at bylaws and policy decisions of the multi-state
association, (3) is consistent with the strictures of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, and (4) imposes no extra-territorial effects. 46 In
such instances, there will be hard cases with respect to whether a
state statute is generally applicable or impermissibly aimed at
substituting state policy for that of a private association, 47 but the
black letter rule is clear.
43.

NCAA DIv. 1 COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 256. The Infractions

Appeals Committee reversed aspects of the COI decision on a finding that some violations were
time-barred. NCAA Div. I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMM., INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 256 (April 13,

2007). On May 9, 2007, the COI issued a Supplemental Report to Infractions Report No. 256.
44.
O'Brien v. Ohio State Univ., 139 Ohio Misc. 2d 36 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2006).
45.
O'Brien, 130 Ohio Misc. 2d at 40 ("[T]he court is persuaded, given the contract
language, that this single, isolated failure of performance was not so egregious as to frustrate the
essential purpose of that contract and thus render future performance by defendant
impossible.").
46.
Nor may members of a private association evade prosecution if their association has
a criminal purpose. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (West 2009).
47.
The impact of federal rules and statutes on the NCAA raises different issues. If
Congress were to enact a statute purposefully and specifically directed to NCAA processes, the
statute would not threaten uniformity. The question would be whether the statute is a
constitutional exercise of a specifically enumerated power under Article I, Section 8, of the
United States Constitution. The most likely claimed source of congressional power would be the
Commerce Clause. When what is governed is neither a channel nor instrumentality of commerce,
the test for deciding whether Congress acts pursuant to this power is whether the (economic)
activities in the aggregate have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. Gonzalez
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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An association's bylaws and policies rarely are adopted
unanimously; in associations, the majority necessarily rules. If an
association member disagrees with a collective decision, the choices
are to comply, resign from the association, or try to forge a new
majority to reverse or change the decision. 48
Judicial review,
particularly of a multi-state association such as the NCAA, should be
limited to assuring that bylaws and policies are duly adopted and that
conduct bylaws are enforced consistent with party expectation and
relevant laws. At the very least, judicial review may be no broader
than that applied to contracts-i.e., good faith and fair dealing. 49 If a
court denies effect to a bylaw duly adopted pursuant to an

48.
A union member objecting to terms in a collective bargaining agreement has these
same choices. E.g., Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353 (1984); George
Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers:
Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897 (1975); Paul Weiler, Striking a New
Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation,98 HARV. L. REV. 351
(1984).
49.
This scope of review has been applied by courts in cases specifically involving the
NCAA. See, e.g., Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1071-72 (N.D. Ga. 2000); Hall v. NCAA,
985 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N.D. Ill. 1997); NCAA v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Ky. 2001); Bloom v.
NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2004).It has been applied in sports cases not involving the
NCAA. See, e.g., Charles 0. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1978);
Straub v. Am. Bowling Cong., 353 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Neb. 1984); Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass'n v. Cox, 425 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tenn. 1968). It has also been applied to other private
associations. See, e.g., Angland v. Doe, 263 F.2d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1958); NAACP v. Golding,
679 A.2d 554, 559 (Md. 1996); Rutledge v. Gulian, 459 A.2d 680 (N.J. 1983); Cal. Dental Ass'n v.
Am. Dental Ass'n, 590 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1979); Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Taylor, 84 So.
609 (Fla. 1920); Levant v. Whitley, 755 A.2d 1036, 1043 n.l (D.C. 2000); Van Valkenburg v.
Liberty Lodge No. 300, 619 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000); ; Anderson v. Enter. Lodge No.
2, 906 P.2d 962, 966 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Reed v. Quatkemeyer, 647 So. 2d 172, 173 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994); Putka v. First Catholic Slovak Union, 600 N.E.2d 797, 802 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991);
Jorgensen Realty, Inc. v. Box, 701 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Colo. App. 1985); Dayan v. McDonald's Corp.,
466 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Bonneville Props., Inc. v. Simons, 677 P.2d 1111, 1113 (Utah
1984); Nat'l Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. O'Sullivan Grange No. 1136, 667
P.2d 1105 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983); Moran v. Vincent, 588 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979);
Crutcher v. Order of Ry. Conductors of Am., 132 S.W. 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910);;Lone Star Lodge
v. Cole, 131 S.W. 1180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910). Only in CaliforniaDental did a court fail to uphold
the prerogative of the private association, holding that the association "plainly contravenes" its
own explicit bylaw language. See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 590 P.2d at 403. In most jurisdictions,
moreover, a member may make no claim for relief from an association's bylaws unless he also
has injury to a legally cognizable property interest. See id.; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468
U.S. 85, 102 (1984); Bd. of Regents v. NCAA, 561 P.2d 499 (Okla. 1977). Courts consistently have
held that student- athletes have no cognizable property interest in competition eligibility. See,
e.g., Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 955 (6th Cir. 1986); Colo. Seminary v. NCAA, 570 F.2d 320,
321 (10th Cir. 1978); Bloom, 93 P.3d at 624; NCAA v. Yeo, 171 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Tex. 2005)
(stating that "the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions" find no due process constitutional right
of students to participate in college athletics competition); Hart v. NCAA, 550 S.E.2d 79, 86 (W.
Va. 2001).
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association's rules 0 in favor of a competing position that the litigating
member likes better, then the court has substituted the predilection of
the minority for the decision of the majority.5 1 The result is antimajoritarian and fundamentally disintegrative.
The anti-majoritarian and disintegrative effect is exacerbated
in a multi-state association. If one state by statute or court decision
may change or nullify a bylaw or policy of such an association, then its
very existence is jeopardized. It could adjust its rules or policies in
all states to follow the lead of the one state, thereby ceding its
authority and prerogatives. Alternatively, it could forego critical
uniformity and administer different rules state to state.52 This option
likely is untenable for any multi-state association, and particularly
lethal for the NCAA, whose prime job is to maintain a level playing
field for athletics competition. As the Supreme Court acknowledged,
"the integrity of the NCAA product cannot be achieved except by
mutual agreement." 53 Mutual agreement produces uniform bylaws to
be uniformly applied, a uniformity aptly described as "the heart of the
NCAA."

54

In the context of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court has long recognized that uniformity is critical to the operation of
instrumentalities in interstate commerce and has overturned state
statutes that effectively regulate conduct in other states. 55 Dormant

50.
If an association fails to follow its own procedures in adopting a rule or articulating a
policy or practice, then a member may challenge that rule in Court. The basis of the challenge,
however, is not an attack on the scope or meaning of a rule but a claim that the rule is invalid
because of procedural defects in its adoption.
51.
As with any legislative or quasi-legislative process, the fact that NCAA legislation
was duly-adopted does not mean that its adopters acted with knowledge or made the best policy
choice. As with any legislative or quasi-legislative process, institutions vote for different reasons.
A legislature speaks with one voice but not all legislators are propelled by the same motive. If
judicial deference to legislative or quasi-legislative decisions required orderly processes,
uniformly knowledgeable voters, or unanimity of motive, there would never be deference.
52.
A private association also may expel association members resident in a state that
seeks to impose its policy choices on it. For a period of time, the California legislature engaged in
such brinksmanship when considering the enactment of a student- athlete's bill of rights. See Bill
proposes to seek UC withdrawal from NCAA, DATELINE UC DAVIS, June 27, 2003,
http://www.dateline.ucdavis.edu/dl detail.lasso?id=6548. Several sections of the bill were in
direct conflict with NCAA fundamental principles and bylaws, including pay for play. See id.
53.
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 85 (1984)
54.
NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1993).
55.
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458
U.S. 941 (1982); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941
(1982); Bibbs v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824). The Nevada Supreme Court overturned a statute intended to impose certain
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Commerce Clause cases are directed at state legislative and executive
action, not courts. A court that refuses effect to an NCAA bylaw
purports to implement the NCAA's meaning as understood by its
members, not to implement state policy as do the statutes in the
Dormant Commerce Clause cases. 56 But the difference between
legislative and court action is more semantic than actual. Court
decisions bypassing the NCAA's interpretation of its bylaws either
change their meaning or force NCAA re-adoption of bylaws to restate
intent. They give litigating plaintiffs a result under NCAA bylaws
different from that intended by the member institutions that adopted
them. Sequentially, and more slowly than legislative action, court
decisions also breed significant disuniformity.
A corollary to the right of private associations to adopt the
rules by which they are governed is the right to control their
enforcement and interpretation.5 7 The authoritative voice on a rule's
scope and meaning is the entity an association designates for that
purpose, but in the routine operation of an association, not every
question can be submitted for interpretation.
An association's
authoritative voice also necessarily includes the shared understanding
of members and what is discerned from the everyday implementation
of policy by those charged with implementation (in other words, the
course of dealing and usage of the trade).
Private associations are not unique in controlling the scope and
meaning of the rules they create. As a general rule, those responsible
for the enactment of statutes and adoption of rules also are the
authoritative source of their meaning.5 8
In the hearing, rulesadoption, and interpretation processes, deference to the drafter is the
order of the day.

procedural requirements on NCAA enforcement policies and infractions hearings due to its
adverse effect on interstate commerce. Miller, 10 F.3d at 633.
56.
Unless, that is, it finds that the bylaw offends the implied duties of good faith and
fair dealing as delineated by state contract law.
57.
See infra text accompanying notes 93-108.
58.
See infra text accompanying notes 93-108.
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATION COMMITTEE AND
INTERPRETATIONS PROCESS
It is often said that "[t]here are two things you don't want to
see being made-sausage and legislation." 59 The Division I legislative
process involves 335 active member institutions and thirty-one
conferences. 60 Drafting and adoption of legislative proposals are done
by those full time at universities or in the athletic enterprise, but far
from full time in their investment and focus on NCAA legislation. 61 In
every yearly legislative cycle, proposals are submitted with little or no
contemporaneous information about other proposals. There may be
several proposals submitted on the same subject.
Even when
proposals cover the same subject with similar outcome and rationale,
they may be variations on a theme. Later in the legislative cycle,
amendments may be offered to some, but not all, of the same-subject
proposals.6 2 Once adopted, proposals are squeezed into the manual of
existing bylaws. Because they were written at different times, by
different people, their language may be different from, or in part
63
repetitive of, language of existing bylaws.
One need not embrace the extremes of nihilism or
deconstructionism to acknowledge that language is not self-defining.
All legal systems have mechanisms to provide controlling
interpretations when the language of a statute or rule is challenged as
insufficiently clear in application. Outside the NCAA model, a court
typically is the adjudicative body that decides the meaning and scope
of statutes and rules, and it does so 6 4 in the concrete circumstances of
65
a litigated case.

59.
See Fred R. Shapiro, Familiar Words from, Unfamiliar Speakers, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 2008, at MM16. The quote comes from a quip by John Godfrey Saxe, though it is frequently
attributed to German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.
60.
E-mail from Stacey Osburn, Associate Director for Public and Media Relations,
NCAA, to Josephine R. Potuto, Richard H. Larson Professor of Constitutional Law, University of
Nebraska-Lincoln College of Law (Nov. 10, 2009, 10:10 EST) (on file with author).
61.
See NCAA Bylaw Figure 5-1 (NCAA Division I Legislative Process) and Figure 5-2
(Legislative Activity Calendar for 2009-10).
62.
NCAA Bylaw 5.3 (Amendment Process); NCAA Bylaw Figure 5-1 (NCAA Division I
Legislative Process) and Figure 5-2 (Legislative Activity Calendar for 2009-10).
63.
Compare NCAA CONST. arts. 6.4.2 (Representatives of Athletics Interests), 6.4.2.2
(Retention of Identity as "Representative"), with NCAA BYLAWS arts. 13.02.13 (Representative of
Athletics Interests), 13.02.13.1 (Duration of Status).
64.
The typical adjudicative body is a court. For administrative rules, the authoritative
voice belongs to the hearing officer. In arbitrations, the arbitrator's decision controls.
65.
The ultimate authority on the scope and meaning of a statute is the legislature that
enacted it. What a judicial opinion controls is the scope and meaning of a statute at a moment in
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An unusual aspect of the NCAA model is that the body that
resolves cases under the bylaws-the COI-is not the same body that
renders authoritative interpretations.
Instead, the interpretative
function vests in the Board of Directors and Legislative Council, with
operational authority to bind members in the Legislative
Interpretation Committee 66 and the staff of the Academic and
Membership Affairs Group (Membership Affairs Group).6 7 Although
this separation of adjudicative and formal interpretive functions is
topsy-turvy compared to the traditional adjudicative model, it is
integral to NCAA governance. 68 In the NCAA world, the bulk of
NCAA compliance-related work is done on the campuses by
institutional compliance staff.69 While investigations of potential
major infractions are certainly not an incidental aspect of the
institutional control obligation of member institutions, they by no
means are the bread and butter of the compliance job. Institutional
compliance staff spend most of their time educating on permissible
conduct and deciding whether contemplated action complies with
NCAA rules. They regularly interact with the Membership Affairs
Group. In matters of bylaw interpretations, the Membership Affairs
Group reports to and takes its marching order from the Legislative
Interpretation Committee. Staff interpretations and the Legislation
Interpretation Committee are critical components of an NCAA
structure that underscores institutional control and campus
responsibility for rules compliance. In this system, it is only natural,
and even necessary, to embrace a broader view of the permissible
scope of interpretation than that which might seem appropriate in the
traditional adjudicative model.
Bylaw
interpretations
are
either
"confirmations" or
"determinations." 70 A confirmation restates that which already is
clear about the operation of a bylaw, while a determination resolves

time. If a court's construction misstates legislative intent, a legislature can respond by amending
the statute clarify intent.
66.
NCAA CONST. art. 5.4.1 (Interpretations of Constitution and Bylaws).
67.
For an illustration of the NCAA model, see NCAA Div. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS,
INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 265 (May 1, 2007) (West Virginia University); NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON
INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 163 11-12 (Dec. 17, 1999) (University of Notre Dame).
68.
See NCAA CONST. art. 5.4.1.2 (Interpretation Process); see also NCAA DI
LEGISLATIVE REVIEW & INTERPRETATIONS COMM.,

POLICIES & PROCEDURES

(Mar. 3, 2008),

available at http://webl.ncaa.org/web files/AMA/LRIC/LRIC%20policies%20and%20procedures%
203-3-08.pdf.
69.
Assisting institutions is the operating call to action of all NCAA staff, no matter
where assigned. Membership Affairs staff are the staff most likely to be committee liaisons.
70.
See generally supra note 68.
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less clear issues in a way consistent with underlying intent.7 1 The
resolution of a determination must be reasonably encompassed within
explicit bylaw language. 72
Legislative Interpretation Committee
interpretations are official and final 73 once the Legislative Council
74
reviews them.
A determination from Membership Affairs staff can issue
before or after conduct has occurred. If a determination prohibits
conduct, then an institution that knows of the determination is bound
to follow it; if it fails to do so, it has committed a violation unless and
until the interpretation is modified or reversed by the Legislative
Interpretation Committee.71 Because confirmations simply confirm
that which is clear in a bylaw, confirmations that conduct is
prohibited cover conduct whether it precedes or comes after the
confirmation. 76 By contrast, determinations that conduct is rulesviolative bind institutions only with regard to post-determination
conduct.
III. NCAA WAIVER PROCESS
Life is like a tube of toothpaste. If you plug a hole in one spot,
the toothpaste oozes out elsewhere. The best that may be done when
drafting a rule is to identify its purpose, consider the potential
consequences, good and bad, of alternative formulations, and
implement the optimum resolution of competing interests that
produces the least predicted toothpaste ooze-in other words, the
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Legislative Interpretation Committee review of confirmations provided in quarterly
reports does not constitute an official Legislative Interpretation Committee interpretation.
74.
See supra note 68.
75.
NCAA CONST. art. 5.4.1.2.1; NCAA DI LEGISLATIVE REVIEW & INTERPRETATIONS
COMM., POLICIES & PROCEDURES, supra note 68, at 8. So long as an institution is ignorant of an
unpublished determination, it will not have violated a bylaw because of it. This is a porous
shield, however. An institution still is bound to adhere to the underlying bylaw's policy and
intent as reasonably discernible and to exercise due diligence in applying and interpreting NCAA
rules. The fact of the interpretation means that some other institution was uncertain as to the
bylaw's impact and sought interpretative assistance and the unpublished interpretation is
evidence that an institution failed its due diligence before engaging in prohibited conduct. See id.
76.
In fact, because a confirmation confirms that which already is clear and binding on
all institutions, institutions are bound to understand conduct is a violation even were a
confirmation never issued. The only claim available to an institution in such a situation,
therefore, is that an interpretation erroneously was characterized as a confirmation. The
situation with a determination is different. All institutions have constructive knowledge of a
determination once announced on the Legislative Services Database ('LSDBi"). See LSDBi
Homepage, https://webl.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/homepage (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
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fewest bad consequences or the fewest effects outside of intended
scope and purpose. No matter how well conceived and drafted a rule
is, inevitably a circumstance will arise that falls within the letter of
the rule but was not intended to be covered by it. The particular
eventuality may have been unforeseen, or it may have been
anticipated and accepted as too complicated to fix in draft language
without creating different, and worse, oozing. To deal with outlier
situations, NCAA committees have authority to grant waivers from
the application of a rule. 77
A waiver process is practical
acknowledgment that no rule can cover all conceivable circumstances
that may arise, that clear and concise language facilitates
comprehension and makes less credible a claim that a rule was
misunderstood in good faith, and that, at times, case-by-case, factspecific review is a preferred way to determine whether exceptional
circumstances are within a rule's intended scope. A process that
permits the waiver of rules, however, does not include the authority to
rewrite them.
Only a member institution may file a waiver request. The
predominant class of waivers is those filed on behalf of studentathletes or prospects. 78 In requesting a waiver, university interests
are aligned with the student's interests since each one benefits if the
waiver is granted. By adequately representing its own interest, then,
the university also represents that of its student.
Administration of waivers vests in the particular committee
with jurisdictional authority to administer the bylaw for which a
waiver is sought. 79 Waiver requests follow a typical pattern. The first
round is handled by staff assigned to, and following guidelines set by,
the applicable bylaw waiver committee. Although a student-athlete
typically does not see a waiver request involving him, his written
77.

See infra note 79.
78.
For example, a student-athlete who seeks reinstatement of eligibility, continuing
eligibility, or a medical hardship waiver relies on his institution to present his claim.
79.
Committees with responsibility for particular bylaws consider waivers specific to the
bylaws for which they have responsibility. Such bylaw responsibility includes waivers of team
CAP rules, NCAA BYLAWS art. 23.1 (Committee on Academic Performance), validation of
academic records of prospective student- athletes, id. arts. 14.1.2.1 (High School Review
Committee), 14.1.2.2 (Student Records Review Committee), and initial and continuing eligibility
of individual student-athletes, id. arts. 14.3.1.5 (Initial-Eligibility Waivers), 14.4.3.6 (Waivers of
Progress-Toward-Degree Rule). Although the NCAA provides no general set of policies and
procedures governing all committees, each committee has published policies and procedures
governing its operations. For example, see NCAA Student Athlete Reinstatement,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM-GLOBAL-CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/ncaa/
NCAA/Legislation%20and%20Governance/Compliance/StudentAthlete%2OReinstatement/
student athlete reinstatement.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2010)
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statement is an included document. Should a waiver be denied, the
institution may appeal the decision to the bylaw waiver committee.
To appeal, the institution submits a written request, which is then
supplemented by teleconference with representatives of the institution
and members of the bylaw waiver committee. An involved studentathlete often participates in the teleconference, at least to answer
committee questions.
A university sometimes does not seek a waiver, even if it
believes there is a credible chance of success. Its reasons not to seek a
waiver may reside in general university or athletics department
policies, or in the interests of efficiency and reasonable allocation of
staff time. A student-athlete's comparatively limited athletics ability,
his past non-adherence to team rules, or the fact that incoming
prospects adequately can replace him may also influence the
university not to seek a waiver. Should a university not process a
waiver, a student-athlete has no independent right to do so. In these
circumstances, his quarrel is with the university, not the NCAA,
particularly if the university's decision rests on grounds other than a
conclusion that the waiver request likely would be denied.
IV. CONTRACT PRINCIPLES AND NCAA PROCESSES
Lawsuits challenging the impact on them of NCAA bylaws
often are brought by student-athletes and sometimes by other NCAA
80
non-members, including institutional staff members; boosters;
entities doing business, or seeking to do business, with the NCAA 81 or
a member institution; and entities in competition with the NCAA.82 A
preliminary question in these cases is whether any of these parties
have standing to challenge a bylaw or practice. For student-athletes
and institutional staff members, the question is whether they are
third-party beneficiaries of the contractual framework of NCAA

80.
A booster, or in NCAA-speak a "representative of the institution's athletics
interests," is an individual or entity who is known or should be known to an institution through
participation in a booster group, donations, or other conduct intended to benefit student -athletes
or an athletics program." NCAA BYLAWS art. 13.0.2.13 (Representative of Athletics Interests).
"A" list boosters stay at team hotels, walk the sidelines, travel in official parties to away games,
and have coaches' cell phone numbers. See id.
81.
Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
82.
For example, a lacrosse stick manufacturer sued the NCAA claiming injury should
the NCAA change the required head size of lacrosse sticks. See Lacrosse Equipment Change Nets
Lawsuit, MLIVE.COM, Aug 29, 2008, available at http://www.mlive.com/news/grandrapids/index.ssf/2008/08/lacrosse equipment change nets.html.
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bylaws. A third-party beneficiary is not a party to a contract (member
of an association) but is a person whom the contracting parties
(association members) intend to benefit.83 Student-athletes are the
only class of non-members with a colorable claim to third-party
beneficiary status.8 4 If a claim is predicated simply on a right to
participate in athletics, a court should give it short shrift since there is
85
no such cognizable property interest.
Nonetheless, student-athlete litigation often is not resolved in
the NCAA's favor as readily as governing law would predict. In part,
this is due to the tendency of fact finders, particularly but not
exclusively juries, to sympathize with a student plaintiff against the
big, bad, NCAA even in the face of governing state law clearly to the
contrary. 86 More fundamentally, however, the difficulty is caused by
NCAA bylaws that reflect a compromise between association core
principles and sensitivity to student-athlete interests. The resultant
compromises stake out ground not as easily defensible to a nonmember judiciary as would be a clearcut and unwavering embodiment
of core principle.
A current example involves litigation that
challenged NCAA amateurism bylaws, the sina qua non of
intercollegiate

athletics.87

From time immemorial NCAA bylaws have treated a studentathlete's representation by an agent as a professionalizing act that
disqualifies her from further intercollegiate competition. The purpose
of such treatment is to prevent agent influence, with the attendant
risk to the coach/student-athlete relationship, exploitation of studentathletes, 88 and overall disruption of efforts to treat elite studentathletes in revenue-producing sports no differently from other
student-athletes. Instead of prohibiting all agent contact at any time,
83.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 10.7-.9; see, e.g., Parish Chiropractic

Ctrs., P.C. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 1049, 1056 (Colo. 1994).
84.
If a student-athlete has third-party beneficiary status, then he may litigate an
alleged denial even if the university does not. See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. App.
2004) (institution joined as defendant with the NCAA).
85.
E.g., Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 955 (6th Cir. 1986); Colo. Seminary v. NCAA,
570 F.2d 320, 321 (10th Cir. 1978); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Bloom, 93
P.3d at 621; Hart v. NCAA, 550 S.E.2d 79, 86 (W. Va. 2001).
86.
Compare, e.g., NCAA v. Yeo, 114 S.W. 3d 584 (Tex. App. 203), with NCA v. Yeo, 171
S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2005).
87.
Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009).
88.
For examples of agent predators, see, for example, United States v. Piggit, 316 F.3d
789 (8th Cir. 203); United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993); Abernathy v. State,
545 So. 2d 185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). See generally DAN WETZEL & DON YAEGER, SOLE
INFLUENCE: BASKETBALL, CORPORATE GREED, AND THE CORRUPTIONOF AMERICA'S YOUTH (Grand

Central Publishing 2000).
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however, NCAA amateurism bylaws distinguish between lawyers
working as lawyers for student-athletes (permitted)8 9 and lawyers
working as agents (prohibited), with a line between the two drawn at
the point a lawyer is present during contract discussions with a
professional sports organization. Andrew Oliver, a baseball pitcher at
Oklahoma State University, challenged these bylaws in a lawsuit
against the NCAA brought after he was rendered ineligible for
competition because his lawyer was present during contract
negotiations with the Minnesota Twins baseball team. The trial judge
held that it violated public policy to prevent a student from having the
assistance of counsel in contract negotiations and stated his concern
with NCAA bylaws that permit student-athletes to hire lawyers but
then "attempt to control what that lawyer does . ..."90 One could
argue that the decision in Oliver failed to appreciate the legitimate
concern of NCAA members with agent influence in the college game.
But the reason the case arose at all is that NCAA bylaws failed to
state an explicit, absolute policy prohibiting agent contact. Such an
absolute policy is not nuanced and admits of no accommodation
focused on student-athlete interests, but it is the policy most insulated
91
from court reversal.
Because rights of third-party beneficiaries are derivative of the
rights of member institutions, they can be no broader or more
extensive than the member's. 9 2 What, then, are the obligations of an
association to members of that association?
An association's first obligation is grounded in its obligation to
adhere to its adopted procedures. What this means is that an
association's bylaws, practices, and policies may bind a member only
when they have been duly adopted according to the bylaws of the
association. Association bylaws govern not only the substantive rights
and obligations of membership, but they also describe the process by
which substantive bylaws are adopted, rescinded, or revised. Included
within this description may be emergency procedures for adopting or
revising bylaws. For the NCAA, this also includes the operation of the
Legislative Interpretation Committee and staff interpretative
processes and the process by which committees determine when
waivers are to be granted.

89.
90.

NCAA BYLAWS Art 12.3.2 (Legal Counsel).
Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 214.

91.

See id.

92.

FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at § 10.9.
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The second obligation of an association to its members is
grounded in its obligation to enforce substantive obligations. Doomed
to failure is a member's challenge to a policy decision embodied in a
particular bylaw if the only ground is disagreement with the policy
choice.
To have any chance at success, then, a member must
challenge bylaw administration and implementation.
Rules and bylaws may not be simply decorative. They must
have functional import. They must be followed. Failure of an
association to assure that bylaws duly adopted actually were
implemented would be a clear breach of the duty owed to members
and, in turn, a failure to act in good faith. It is the rare situation,
however, in which an association fails completely to implement
bylaws.
Instead, the locus of challenges is on the manner of
implementation.
A. ContractPrinciples:Waivers and Interpretations
1. Good Faith
Consider the contract principle of good faith in the context of
NCAA waiver requests. An institution seeks a waiver from the
application of an NCAA bylaw precisely because the bylaw prohibits
what the institution seeks to do. Absent actual malice or bias in the
denial of a waiver, it is hard to see how declining to waive a bylaw
could breach good faith when the bylaw's language and purposes cover
the very conduct for which waiver is sought.
Next, consider requests for interpretations of bylaws. An
institution seeks a bylaw interpretation when it believes that black
letter and underlying intent offer no clear direction as to scope and
meaning in context. Only an obviously contrived articulation of the
scope and meaning of a bylaw could begin to constitute a breach of
good faith. Even in this case, a court's obligation to defer means that
it should tread carefully in determining what is "obviously contrived,"
as that conclusion itself implicates NCAA interpretative authority.
2. Fair Dealing
At least in theory, bylaws may be interpreted or waived in such
a blatantly targeted manner as to constitute a failure to deal fairly
with-i.e., to act arbitrarily toward-a particular member institution.
Recall, however, that NCAA bylaws, practices, and policies, including
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the process of interpretation, are the collective decision of all member
institutions.9 3 Particular bylaws seen to benefit some institutions
more than others are still the collective decision of all. If a member
institution is unhappy with its treatment, it may resign from the
NCAA or attempt to forge a new majority. Because of the diversity
among NCAA members, duly-adopted bylaws need not, and likely
could not, affect results with even-handed consequence to all
institutions. Interpretations do not show animus, therefore, simply by
enforcing bylaw meaning that has differential consequence. What
must be shown is targeted animus in the interpretation. This is, and
should be, an extremely high standard difficult for a plaintiff to meet.
NCAA bylaws embody compromise positions of competing
policies. In turn, the wallpaper of all bylaws is a balance of competing
policies. The combination of policy compromise in particular bylaws
and the interworking of related bylaws may not consistently point to a
particular policy end-point. Deference to an association necessarily
includes deference to compromises duly adopted. Fair dealing must be
evaluated in the grand scale of NCAA conduct, not by picking and
choosing particular bylaws and policies across different subject
areas. 94 Absence of fair dealing in the legislative articulation of policy,
the application of bylaws, or grants of waivers from them, must mean
inconsistency so random and gross that there is no rationale adequate
to cover bylaws in their totality or to explain differences.
3. The Jeremy Bloom Case As Illustration
Assume that, pursuant to committee guidelines or staff
discretion, NCAA staff decline to grant an institution's requested
waiver. Assume that the institution appeals to the applicable bylaw
waiver committee and that the committee upholds the staff decision.
The university now brings suit to overturn the result. To assure that

93.
The fact that governing bylaws are adopted by those to be governed by them likely
triggers even more deference than the quite deferential standard otherwise afforded agency
rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-06 (West 2009). The Supreme Court dictates deference to
agency interpretation of a statute it administers so long as the interpretation is reasonable.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Amanda
Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangersof Imposing a Standing Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391,
416 (2009) ('Chevron deference . . . and the [Administrative Procedures Act's] arbitrary-andcapricious review standard give judges ample room to defer to, or simply decline to review, all
but the most blatantly unlawful agency policy choices.").
94.
To best effectuate party intent, contract terms are read in light of the contract in its
entirety, not by treating particular provisions in a vacuum. See, e.g., Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d
621 (Colo. App. 2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203.
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a bylaw was applied in good faith, a court should first consider
whether NCAA staff and committee followed designated procedures in
handling the waiver and appeal. A court must then assure that NCAA
processes and the decisions rendered thereunder constituted fair
dealing with the institution.
A good illustration of how a court should review bylaws and
policies of the NCAA involves a lawsuit brought by Jeremy Bloom, a
student-athlete on the University of Colorado football team. 9 Before
enrolling at Colorado, Bloom was a World Cup skier with offers to host
a TV show, model clothes, and endorse products. 96 NCAA bylaws
permitted him to be a professional skier and yet still be an amateur in
football, 97 but they made him ineligible for competition if he pursued
endorsements 98 or other paid business opportunities available to him
because of his athletic ability. On Bloom's behalf, the university
unsuccessfully
sought an interpretation that his projected
endorsements did not offend NCAA amateurism bylaws and also
unsuccessfully sought a waiver to permit him to endorse products and
yet remain eligible.
Bloom then sued, 99 claiming that the multitude of intersecting
NCAA bylaws that underpin the NCAA amateurism principle' 0 0 were
so inconsistent as to be arbitrary in application. 10
The Colorado
95.
96.
97.
98.

Bloom, 93 P.3d 621.
Id. at 622.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 12.1.2 (Amateur Status).
Id. art. 12.5.2.1 (Advertisements and Promotions After Becoming a Student-Athlete).
99.
Bloom was denied a preliminary judgment by the trial judge on the ground that
there was no reasonable likelihood he would succeed on the merits should a full trial be held; the
Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623, 628.
100.
Those applicable to consideration of Bloom's challenge included NCAA CONST. art.
2.9 (Principle of Amateurism); NCAA BYLAWS arts. 12.1.2 (Amateur Status), 12.3.1 (Use of
Agents; General Rule), 12.4.1.1 (Athletics Reputation), 12.5.1.3 (Continuation of Modeling and
Other
Nonathletically Related Promotional
Activities After Enrollment),
12.5.2.1
(Advertisements and Promotions After Becoming a Student-Athlete).
101.
Although the Colorado Court of Appeals found none of Bloom's claims persuasive, it
is instructive to consider its recitation of the various ways that the NCAA could be seen to be
arbitrary. One example is the different approaches taken in bylaws. In Bloom, the court
compared a sports-specific amateurism approach that permits a student-athlete to be a paid
professional in one sport and yet an amateur in a different sport to an all-sports approach in
bylaws making a student-athlete ineligible for all competition should he endorse products or
engage in paid activities available to him because of athletics ability. See Bloom, 93 P.3d at 62527. Another example is prohibiting student-athletes from engaging in conduct that their
institution engage in. In Bloom, the court considered a prohibition on student-athlete product
endorsements compared to institutional endorsements through student-athletes wearing logos
during competition. Id. Yet another example is granting waivers to some student-athlete but not
others when the underlying circumstances are similar. A final example is treating a waiver
request from one institution with less care and attention than that given other institutions.
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Court of Appeals reviewed the bylaws to see if the NCAA met its
duties of good faith and fair dealing. It found a clear intent to prohibit
student-athletes from engaging in endorsements and paid media
appearances, and that the "various shades of gray within [an
amateurism approach]" did not constitute an arbitrary application of a
clear NCAA intent to prohibit student-athletes from engaging in such
activities. 10 2 The court indicated that any ambiguity in NCAA bylaws
would have been enforced according to how the NCAA-not the
10 3
court-interpreted them.
V. NCAA COMMITTEES AND PROCESSES: REINSTATEMENT;
ENFORCEMENT; INFRACTIONS
First and foremost among the responsibilities that all member
institutions impose on each member institution is institutional
control. 0 4 Institutional control requires institutions to self-police and
then to self-report if violations are uncovered. 0 5 If all institutions at
all
times
had
perfect
ability
and
willingness
to
self-police and all institutions at all times had perfect trust and
confidence in the self-policing of all other institutions and
self-policing handled exclusively at the institutional level nonetheless
achieved across all institutions a consistent approach to evaluation of
the severity of violations and the appropriate penalties attendant on
any such violations, then there would be no need for NCAA
enforcement staff. In the real and competitive world of intercollegiate
athletics, the presence of enforcement staff members provides
critically important comfort to each institution that all institutions are
being held to the same standard.
Several committees and staffs have responsibilities related to
the reporting, investigation, and resolution of NCAA violations, either
directly or collaterally.
Prime among them are the COI, the
Infractions Appeals Committee (IAC), the Reinstatement Committee,
the Legislative Interpretation Committee, 0 6 and the enforcement
staff.10 7 These committees and their staffs operate independently of

102.
Id.; see also Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Fixed Base Operators, Inc., 939 P.2d 464, 467
(Colo. App. 1997).
103.
Bloom, 93 P.3d at 626.
104.
NCAA CONST. art. 2.1 (The Principle of Institutional Control and Responsibility).
105.
Id. art. 2.8.1 (Responsibility of Institution).
106.
For a description of individuals who have served on the COI, see infva note 198.
107.
The Leadership Council typically makes appointments to Division I committees
through nominations from conference offices. NCAA BYLAWS arts. 21.7.89.3 (Committees
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one another and have different functions and responsibilities. In
particular, the membership and role of the COI is distinct from the
enforcement staff, and its investigation and presentation of infractions
cases, and from the Reinstatement Committee and its staff and
processes. 10 8 The enforcement staff report to the Division I vice
president for enforcement. The student-athlete reinstatement staff
report to the vice president for Membership Affairs. The COI staff
report to the vice president for Division 1.109
A. Student-Athlete Reinstatement
Institutional staff members, boosters, student-athletes, and, in
some circumstances, even prospects may commit NCAA violations. 110
A violation that a student-athlete or prospect commits is handled
through the reinstatement process.11 1
A student-athlete who commits a violation is ineligible for
competition unless and until he is reinstated to eligibility.112 The

Reporting to Board of Directors; Committee on Infractions), 21.7.89.4 (Committees Reporting to
Board of Directors; Infractions Appeals Committee). Appointments to the COI and the Division I
Infractions Appeals Committee are made by the DI Board of Directors. Id.
108.
The COI is also separate and distinct from the IAC and staff. IAC staff report to the
NCAA vice president.
109.
The vice president for Division I has responsibility for Division I governance and
administrative matters.
110.
Prospects can render themselves ineligible for competition at NCAA institutions by,
among other things, signing a professional contract. NCAA BYLAWS art. 12.2.5. Violations
committed by institutional staff members may also involve prospects. For example, a coach may
make a prohibited contact with a prospect. See generally NCAA BYLAWS art. 13.1.
111.
A unit of the enforcement staff agents, gambling, and amateurism (AGA staff)also investigates student-athlete violations. See infra text accompanying notes 257-58. On rare
occasion the COI may make a finding of unethical conduct against a student-athlete. E.g., NCAA
DIv. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 266 (May 10, 2007) (Temple
University). It does not, however, assess penalties but instead refers the case to the
Reinstatement Committee. See id.
112.
Although a student-athlete's ineligibility runs from commission of the violation, a
university may not learn of it until later. If he competed while ineligible, the ineligible
competition is a second violation for which he, and the university, are responsible. NCAA DIV. I
COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 294 (Mar. 6, 2009) (Florida State University).
If the university had reasonable institutional control mechanisms in place, it will not be found to
have lacked institutional control or failed to monitor in not discovering the underlying violation.
According to the reinstatement staff, in only one percent of reinstatement cases is a violation so
serious and the responsibility of the student-athlete so significant that reinstatement is denied.
Hearing on Due Process and the NCAA Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the H. Comm. on the
Judicicay, 108th Cong. 35-42 (2004), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Legacy/95802.pdf.
Most often, reinstatement is granted with conditions. Id. Every extra benefit violation requires
disgorgement of the benefit. For benefits of $100 or more a student-athlete also will have to sit
out games; the number of games is gauged on the amount of the benefit. NCAA Div. I STUDENT-
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merits of this approach are obvious, particularly in a world devoid of
subpoena power where a prime source of information about violations
comes from institutional self-reports. In such a world, every good
reason exists to create the strongest possible incentive for prompt selfreporting-and what better incentive than student-athlete ineligibility
until a report is made and the matter resolved?
Reinstatement requests are processed in the first instance by
reinstatement staff pursuant to guidelines from the Reinstatement
Committee and with appeals heard by it. Violations run the gamut
from a student-athlete competing before her formal certification as
eligible, 113 to her receipt of extra benefits, 114 to her commission of
academic fraud, 115 to her competing while ineligible. 116 The volume of
requests is high and cases often are extremely time sensitive.
Institutions act through those for whom they are responsible.
Every student-athlete violation, therefore, is also an institutional
violation, and every reinstatement request must include, or be
accompanied by, a report of institutional violation. Typically, a
university makes one integrated submission to the student-athlete
reinstatement staff, which then forwards it to the enforcement staff to
review and process for institutional responsibility. Most often, the
Director of Enforcement for Secondary Violations (the Director for
Secondaries) handles the report, 117 although on occasion the report is
forwarded to the major case enforcement staff to process as a major
infractions case.

ATHLETE REINSTATEMENT GUIDELINES, BYLAW 16.11.2.1 (2009). Academic fraud violations result
in permanent ineligibility. NCAA Div. I STUDENT-ATHLETE REINSTATEMENT GUIDELINES, BYLAW

10.1-(B) (2009). The presumptive withholding penalty for providing false and misleading
information under Bylaw 10.1 is 50 percent of a season's competitions with a maximum penalty
of permanent ineligibility. NCAA Div. I STUDENT-ATHLETE REINSTATEMENT GUIDELINES, BYLAW
10.1-(D) (2009).

113.
E.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 210 (June 17,
2003) (Rutgers University).
114.
E.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 270 (Feb. 22,
2008) (University of Oklahoma).
115.
E.g., INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 294, supra note 112; NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON
INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 221 (Sept. 30, 2004) (Stetson University); NCAA DIV. I
COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 175 (July 16, 2002) (Howard University);

NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 175 (Nov. 27, 2001).
116.
E.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 210 (June 17,
2003) (Rutgers University).
117.
Certain secondaries are de minimis. See NCAA Division I - Level II Violations,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/NCAA/Legislationo20ando20Governance/Compliance/
Secondary%20lnfractions/level II violations D-I (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).
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The reinstatement process operates full throttle under the
NCAA cooperative principle 118 and the obligation of member
institutions to administer rules-compliant athletics programs. 119 As
with all committees other than the COI, the Reinstatement
Committee and staff neither conduct investigations nor engage in
independent fact finding. Instead, they assess a student-athlete's
responsibility based on information that his institution provides and
then decide whether-and, if so, how-he may be reinstated to
eligibility. 120
What is assumed and expected in the reinstatement process is
that a reporting institution has conducted an investigation sufficient
to uncover full relevant facts and has presented them to the
Reinstatement Committee with neither misrepresentation nor
omission. Whether through inability, disinclination, or time pressure,
compliance staff do not always do a thorough investigation and/or
submitted a full and fully forthcoming reinstatement request. 121
Reinstatement requests often need to be processed quickly
because a game or meet is coming up. It is not uncommon for
compliance units to be understaffed; 122 often the first institutional
action in response to uncovering major violations is to hire additional
compliance staff.123 Institutional compliance directors are not trained
investigators. Their background and experience is in educating and
advising on bylaws and assisting staff to be rules compliant. They do
their jobs expecting co-workers to be truthful. They tend to accept
answers uncritically and may fail to confirm information. They
sometimes permit coaches and others to gather critical information,
even when these coaches and others have a significant stake in the
outcome of the investigation. 1 24 Their understandable reluctance to
118.
NCAA BYLAWS arts. 19.0.1.3 (Responsibility to Cooperate); 32.1.4 (Committee on
Infractions-Special Operating Rules; Cooperative Principle).
119.
NCAA CONST. art. 2.8; e.g., NCAA BYLAWS arts. 14.01.3 (Compliance with Other
NCAA and Conference Legislation), 14.1.2.3.1 (Institutional Responsibility), 14.11.1 (Obligation
of Member Institution to Withhold Student-Athlete from Competition).
120.
See supra note 112. Student-athletes who commit gambling and academic fraud
violations are permanently ineligible. Id.
121.

NCAA DIv. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 262 (Oct. 12, 2006)

("[C]ompliance doesn't sell tickets.") (University of Kansas); NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON
INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 191 (Dec. 21, 2001) (Marshall University).
122.

INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 262, supra note 121; NCAA DIv. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS,

INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 236 (June 23, 2005) (Baylor University).
123.
NCAA Div. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 278 (July 16, 2008)
(Texas Southern University).
124.

See, e.g., NCAA DIv I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 287 (Nov.

25, 2008) (Indiana University); INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 265, supra note 67.
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harm team competitive strength may color their assessment of factual
circumstances.
Good investigations, by contrast, require time, diligence,
testing and confirming information, conducting investigations in ways
designed to be impervious to tampering, 125 and doing it all with a
healthy degree of skepticism. Even a trained investigator-let alone
compliance directors in a time crunch-may not uncover the full
circumstances surrounding a violation. If a compliance director lacks
the time or training to do a thorough job, then her report may be full
and fully forthcoming based on what she knows but not full and
forthcoming based on what actually occurred. Reinstatement and
other processes that operate on the cooperative model are bound to
miss more violations and are more likely to understate the severity of
126
these violations than would be the case in an investigative model.
But the basic structure-relying on institutional factfinding-is
12 7
necessary despite its shortcomings.
Often, reinstatement requests are straightforward and require
little investigation. It is inefficient and expensive to administer a
process unnecessary in most cases to handle a minority where followup would uncover additional or more serious violations. At the very
least, reinstatement staff would have to evaluate each case to
determine with certainty that no follow-up is needed. Charged with
the obligation independently to verify, reinstatement staff might err
on the side of looking closely at cases where no follow-up is required
for fear of missing some that on the surface seem complete. Even for
the minority of cases where follow-up would uncover a greater scope
and magnitude to violations than those reported by an institution,
independent
reinstatement
investigations
are
problematic.
Independent investigations might mean the equivalent of adding
reinstatement investigative staff and conducting an adversarial
hearing. Investigations and adversarial hearings are time-consuming.
Infractions cases always take at least a year between onset of
investigation and hearing and typically two or longer. In contrast,

125.

NCAA Div. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 176 (Oct. 24, 2000)

(University of Minnesota) (regarding a coach who was told that student-athletes were to be
interviewed regarding academic fraud met with each and advised them to lie).
126.
See, e.g., INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 287, supra note 124 (assistant compliance
director testified she "can't be a jerk with coaches and then turn around and educate them the
next day"); INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 265, supra note 67; INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 191, supra
note 121 (three self-reports filed; first two based on inadequate or non-existent investigations).
127.
Nonetheless, reinstatement processes could be improved. See infra text
accompanying notes 251-58.
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competition seasons are short, as is the life span of a student-athlete's
eligibility-four years of competition and five years in which to do
it.128 Any time delay, therefore, has acute significance.
There are critical differences between reinstatement and
infractions processes, however, that justify the consequences of delay
in the infractions process.
The biggest difference is that the
infractions process focuses on a continuing entity: the institution at
which violations occurred.
The institution was responsible for
violations when they were committed. The institution reaped the
competitive rewards. The institution incurs the penalties when they
are imposed. Although there is no way to avoid all impact on nonculpable coaches and student-athletes, another difference between the
reinstatement and enforcement/infractions processes is that, in the
latter process, these impacts may be ameliorated. Coaches may leave
to coach elsewhere. Prospects likely know of a pending infractions
case before choosing where to commit.
B. The Enforcement Staff
The prime responsibilities of the enforcement staff are to
investigate and process violations and to present cases for the CO to
resolve. Units of the enforcement staff also perform two ancillary
functions: enforcement of secondary violations and enforcement of
agent, gambling, and amateurism (AGA) violations. Both units have
responsibilities that align closely with the responsibilities of the
Reinstatement Committee.
1. Agents, Gambling, and Amateurism
AGA jurisdiction runs to student-athletes who commit
violations such as engaging in promotional activities, having
prohibited agent contact, or gambling on college sports.
AGA
violations are always student-athlete or prospect violations. As a
result, they always carry at least the potential of competition
ineligibility. 129 As with all enforcement staff, AGA staff can conduct
independent investigations.

128.
NCAA BYLAWS arts. 14.2 (Seasons of Competition), 14.2.1 (Five-Year Rule).
129.
Because of this, AGA and reinstatement staffs have regular interaction. AGA staff
also have three to five joint investigations annually with the major case enforcement staff.
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2. Secondaries
NCAA violations may be major or secondary. A secondary
violation is one that (1) is either isolated or inadvertent, (2) is
intended to provide or provides only a minimal recruiting, competitive,
or other advantage, and (3) includes neither a significant recruiting
inducement nor extra benefit. 130 Although the COT has authority over
secondary as well as major violations, processing of secondaries has
been delegated to the enforcement staff131 and is administered by the
Director for Secondaries. It is rare for the Director for Secondaries to
conduct an independent investigation, but he has the means and
authority to do so. He also can request additional information from an
institution before resolving a secondary case. Violations on the cusp
between secondary and major are referred to the COT for a decision as
to processing.132
C. The Enforcement Processfor Major Infractions Cases
The Vice President of Enforcement and the major case
enforcement staff handle potentially major violations.
The
enforcement staff conducts investigations and is the moving party at
COI hearings. Its role is something like that of police in investigating
crimes or a prosecutor presenting cases in court. Something like, but
not the same. Per NCAA bylaws, the role of the enforcement staff is
not technically adversarial. 133 Although, obviously and necessarily,
preparing an enforcement staff case summary and presenting a case
to the COI entails a staff determination that there is sufficient
information from which to believe that major violations were
committed, the enforcement staff also is expected to alert the COI to
exculpatory information. 134
When it believes it possible and
warranted, it also assists institutions and involved individuals to
gather information relevant to alleged violations.
Major case investigations typically begin with information that
the enforcement staff receives from an institutional self-report,
coaches at other institutions, 135 media stories, and even anonymous

130.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 19.02.2.1. Multiple secondary violations collectively may
constitute a major violation. Id.
131.
Id. art. 19.5.1.
132.
See id. art. 32.2.2.1.2 (Identification of Major/Secondary Violation).
133.
See generally id. arts. 19 (Enforcement), 32 (Enforcement Policies and Procedures).
134.
See infra notes 229-32.
135.
For an example of a head coach providing information, see infra note 154.
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tips. Sometimes, a story breaks because of disgruntled staff members
or student-athletes. 13 6
When it develops reasonably reliable
information that a violation may have been committed, the
enforcement staff sends a Notice of Inquiry to the institution, which
alerts it that a formal investigation has been initiated. 137 When the
enforcement staff decides that there is sufficient information to
38
support a finding of violation, it issues a Notice of Allegations.
39
Responses follow from the institution and involved individuals.
Next, the enforcement staff conducts prehearing conferences to
narrow the issues in dispute. 140 The enforcement staff then produces
its case summary, which is a list of particulars regarding each
allegation and the most important information on which the staff
141
relies in making the allegation.
1. Meaning and Effect of the Cooperative Principle
In the criminal law system, police and prosecutors have
subpoena power and the threat of contempt to compel cooperation. In
civil trials, parties must cooperate with discovery, answer
interrogatories, and submit to depositions.1 42 They are obliged to
answer truthfully.
If they fail to comply, they are subject to
prosecution for perjury, contempt of court, 143 and limits on the

136. As reported in an Alabama infractions case, booster money was used to pay a high
school coach between $100,000 and $200,000 in cash and an SUV to "deliver" a football prospect
to the university. NCAA Div. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 193 (Feb. 1,
2002) (University of Alabama). In the same case, boosters were reported to have provided
$20,000 to a prospective student-athlete and his family. Id. In a case involving the University of
Michigan, a booster gave four student-athletes cash and benefits totaling more than $600,000.
NCAA Div. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 208 (May 8, 2003). In

yet

another infractions case-this one involving Southern Methodist University and the only time
the Infractions Committee imposed the so-called "death penalty," see NCAA BYLAWS art.
19.5.2.3.2 (Repeat-Violator Penalties) boosters made weekly cash payments to members of the
football team. NCAA Div. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT (Feb. 25, 1987); see
also DAVID WHITFORD, A PAYROLL TO MEET: A STORY OF GREED, CORRUPTION, AND FOOTBALL AT
SMU (1989).
137.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 32.5.
138.
Id. art. 32.6.
139.
See id. art. 32.6.5 (Deadline for Responses).
140.
Id. art. 32.6.6.
141.
Id. art. 32.6.7.
142.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26-31, 33.
143.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37. Depositions also may be taken of non-parties. FED. R. Civ. P. 3031. Attendance may be compelled by subpoena. Id. An individual who fails to comply may be held
in contempt. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(e). See generally 7 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE chs. 30-37 (3d ed. 1999).
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introduction of evidence and arguments they may make at trial if they
do not comply. 144 In both criminal and civil systems, an individual
may not be compelled to respond to requested information when a
response would subject him to potential criminal prosecution. 14 In
neither the criminal nor civil justice systems, however, are parties or
witnesses obliged to volunteer information not asked or to clarify
responses to avoid misunderstandings. 146 Routine legal advice directs
parties to respond accurately but specifically and not to volunteer
anything.
By contrast to both the criminal and civil justice systems,
NCAA enforcement staff has neither subpoena or contempt power nor
access to court-supervised discovery. All that NCAA staff has are the
requisites of institutional control and the cooperative principle.
Institutional control means that an institution has the
responsibility to investigate potential violations vigorously and
expeditiously, to share inculpatory information with the enforcement
staff, and to cooperate fully as the enforcement staff does its
investigation. In turn, and pursuant to the cooperative principle,
member institutions require that staff members and student-athletes
agree to be bound by it. They also make a full effort to achieve
cooperation by boosters and others associated with a program. The
obligation of a staff member and student-athlete is to report potential
violations, 147 to submit to interviews with the enforcement staff,1 48 to

144.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c).
145.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. This right does not permit ignoring a subpoena for physical
evidence, however, unless the act of production would be incriminating and testimonial. See, e.g.,
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
146.
A deposition of then President Bill Clinton illustrates the principle. Clinton had oral
sex with an intern but denied having sexual relations under a judicial definition that failed to
include oral sex. See Peter Tiersma, Did Clinton Lie?: Defining "Sexual Relations," 79 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 927 (2004).
147.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 30.3 (Certification of Compliance) (requiring staff members to
certify that they have no knowledge of any NCAA violations at their institution). For the
obligation of student-athletes, see NCAA CONST. art. 3.2.4.6 (Student-Athlete Statement); NCAA
BYLAWS arts. 14.1.3.1 (Student-Athlete Statement; Content and Purpose), 30.12 (StudentAthlete Statement).
148.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 10.1(a). Staff members and student -athletes commit unethical
conduct by refusing to "furnish information relevant to an investigation of a possible violation of
an NCAA regulation when requested to do so." Id.
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respond truthfully, 149 and to cooperate fully with the enforcement staff
15 0
in an investigation.
What NCAA staff cannot compel, therefore, staff and studentathletes are obliged to volunteer.
Those obliged to volunteer
information include both those alleged to have committed violations
and those with information about them. This includes not only
providing truthful answers to questions but also answering a question
clearly intended but not explicitly asked and neither misstating,
obfuscating, or creating a false impression through calculated
omissions, nor influencing others to do so. Still, making a case
exclusively on the cooperative principle is fraught with limitations.
15 1
Some limitations are inevitable, some not so much.
a. Those Subject to the Cooperative Principle
The enforcement staff cannot force a staff member or studentathlete to fulfill the obligations of the cooperative principle. Staff
members and student-athletes may have committed violations
themselves. Confessing to wrongdoing is never easy, particularly
when the consequences may result in job loss or competition
ineligibility. Many will deny involvement or admit only what already
is known. Admitting carelessness is not much easier, particularly
when failure to report a violation known or suspected also may be a
violation.15 2
"Ratting out" a friend or co-worker or providing
information that may adversely affect a team's competitive success
also do not make a hit parade of fun activities. Assistant coaches, in
particular, may fear that cooperation translates to the end of their
college coaching careers.15 3 Violations in a high-profile athletics
program or involving elite student-athletes trigger intense media and
public scrutiny. Those with information may be reluctant to risk

149.

Id. art. 10.1(d). Staff members and student- athletes commit unethical conduct by

"[k]nowingly furnishing . . . false or misleading information concerning . . . involvement in or

knowledge of matters relevant to a possible violation of an NCAA regulation." Id.
150.
Id. art. 19.01.3 (Responsibility to Cooperate).
151.
For what might ameliorate investigative difficulties, see infra text accompanying
notes 242-46.
152.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 10.1.
153.
This worry is not unfounded. In an infractions case involving Baylor University, an
assistant coach taped meetings with the head coach at which violations were discussed. His
information formed part of the COI record. INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 236, supra note 122. He has
not found another job in college coaching.
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harassment of themselves or family, or to face skepticism regarding
15 4
their credibility or motives.
When the enforcement staff has sufficient information from
which to conclude that an institution or individual is not cooperating,
the enforcement staff may allege violations stemming from that
failure-lack of institutional control, failure to monitor, failure to
cooperate, and unethical conduct as a result of refusing to provide
55
information or knowingly providing false or misleading information. 1
The enforcement staff also may allege additional substantive
violations or treat as an admission an involved individual's failure to
respond. 15 6 There are limits on doing any of this, however.
Alleging additional violations may be something of a toothless
tiger. This is particularly true with staff members who may choose to
move on to careers outside of NCAA member institutions or with
student-athletes soon to be gone from an institution. In any event, the
enforcement staff may have little solid basis for concluding that a
violation was committed, or how. Focusing in particular on an
allegation of failure to cooperate, the enforcement staff may be unable
to show that an individual is withholding information or the nature of
the information withheld. An individual's information may not go to
the heart of a violation but provide only context. The information may
be difficult or impossible to corroborate. The individual may report
information gleaned at second- or third-hand. There is a natural
reluctance to charge or penalize an individual for failure to cooperate
when she herself is not suspected of culpability, particularly when the
quality of her information is unknown.
Certainly this information might still be important. It could
provide leads and point the enforcement staff to those with direct and
better information or become significant when grouped with
information from other sources. It is also true that all investigations

154.
The travails of Phillip Fulmer, the head football coach at the University of
Tennessee, offer an apt example. Fulmer assisted the enforcement staff in an infractions
investigation. A booster whose conduct was described in the infractions report sued the NCAA
and Fulmer for defamation. See, e.g., Doug Segrest, Fainter Gets Subpoena, BIRMINGHAM NEWS,
July 25, 2008, at 6D. NCAA bylaws attempt to mitigate these effects by requiring closed
infractions hearings and directing staff to refrain from public comments. Often facts of an
investigation get out, through independent media interviews with witnesses, public action taken
by an institution (firing a coach, for example), and institutional responses released to the media
under open records statutes. Names in these documents may be redacted, but there often is
sufficient information from which to identify individuals.
155.
See NCAA CONST. arts. 2.1, 2.8; NCAA BYLAWS arts. 11.1.2.1 (Responsibility of Head
Coach), 19.01.3, 10.1(a), 10.1(d).
156.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 32.6.2 (Notice to Involved Individuals).
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suffer if there is a shared, known "scofflaw" attitude among those
interviewed. Nonetheless, the threat of an allegation and a finding of
violations may have significant impact on an individual. That being
so, in most cases the enforcement staff is right to pause before making
such allegations. It is easy to say that an individual failing to
cooperate is the one with the key in the ignition that triggers the
allegations. It is not always as easy to act accordingly.
b. Those Not Subject to the Cooperative Principle
Whatever the limits are to investigation by cooperative
principle, they are magnified when information is sought from those
with no formal relationship with a member institution or the NCAA,
such as agents, representatives of professional teams, reporters,
prosecutors, 15 7 and families of student-athletes. No penalty that the
COI imposes can affect an agent with whom a student-athlete signs a
contract or who pays a student-athlete to sign a contract. Similarly, no
penalty can affect a family member of a student-athlete, although in a
particular case the family member's conduct may be attributable to
the student-athlete. Those not bound by the cooperative principle can
thumb their noses with impunity when the enforcement staff comes
calling even as they share their stories with the media.
2. What Use, Subpoena Power?
Whether a private association should be able to make
individuals once or currently formally associated with a member
institution cooperate in investigations on threat of jail time is
debatable, and ideally there should be no such authority. Whether a
private association should be able to make individuals never formally
associated with it cooperate in investigations is almost always
overreaching pure and simple. Even if subpoena power was afforded
in only limited instances, aligning with the government might produce
different, or broader, judicial review of the infractions process in
general, with attendant costs and delays. Were the NCAA to test the
waters, however, what help would result?
The COI imposes penalties for non-cooperation after a case is
brought and findings are made. By contrast, subpoena power is

157.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FORMER BARTON COUNTY
BASKETBALL COACH PLEADS GUILTY (2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/

invtreports/ks122005.html; John Branston, Kickoff, At Last, MEMPHIS FLYER, Jan. 21, 2005,
available at http://www.memphisflyer.com/memphis/kickoff-at-last/Content?oid=1115889.
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enforceable at the front end of an investigation, offering more
investigative leads and a better opportunity to build a full case.
Forcing witnesses to divulge information through a subpoena backed
by a threat of jail is, in theory, quite a power. But other investigative
158
tools, such as wiretaps, likely would be much more help.
Statutory authority likely will permit use of subpoena power
only in precisely defined and limited circumstances.
These
circumstances may turn out to exclude "strangers" to the NCAA
process. Even if they are included, a statute likely will require that
issuance of a subpoena be based on a quantum of credible information
that the individual has relevant information. A critical need in
investigations, however, is to obtain information where the requisite
factual basis underlying the suspicion cannot be shown.
The end result is that any subpoena power granted would be
limited, and those limits run to some of the same investigative
difficulties that the cooperative principle poses.
It also is
inconceivable that NCAA enforcement staff would push to its legal
limit any subpoena authority granted to it. Subpoena power would be
used sparingly not only because its use likely would be dependent on a
showing of reasonable cause that a witness has relevant information,
but because any broader use would both appear, and be criticized, as a
witch hunt. Its use would be most limited where most neededagainst those not associated with universities, or no longer associated
with them. The more sparing NCAA subpoena authorization is, and
the more sparing its actual use, the more politically palatable and
justifiable such subpoena power is.
The more sparing its
authorization and actual use, the fewer problems it would actually
solve.
D. The CO1
The jurisdictional responsibility of the COI is to hear and
resolve cases of institutional culpability 1 9 for the commission of major
violations 160 of NCAA bylaws. 161 The COT does not investigate alleged

158. See INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 208, supra note 136. The violations occurred in 1996
but there was insufficient evidence to proceed until an FBI sting operation that included
wiretaps. See id. at 2.
159.
The COI does not handle student-athlete reinstatement matters or impose penalties
on student-athletes.
160.
The COI does not resolve secondary violations unless processed as part of a major
case. The COI hears appeals in secondary violations when the penalty imposed is a fine. NCAA
BYLAwS art. 32.4.4.
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major violations, conduct pre-hearing witness interviews, engage in
pre-hearing factfinding, or participate in pre-hearing conferences. It
neither sees nor reviews information that the enforcement staff,
institution, coaches or staff members alleged to have committed major
violations surfaced unless that information is made a formal part of
the hearing record. 162 NCAA staff liaisons to the COI work exclusively
with it. They are not members of the enforcement staff. COI
deliberations and case-relevant discussions are confidential within the
COI. Although self-enforcement and the cooperative principle are part
of the infractions process, what sets the COT apart from all other
NCAA committees is that it conducts in-person, adversarial hearings
and makes its own factual findings based on the record before it.163 It
also writes full infractions reports explaining the reasons for its
16 4
findings and penalties.
1. Limitations of the Cooperative Principle and Obligations of the COI
The COI takes seriously its obligation to act independently
from the enforcement staff and to treat fairly institutions and involved
individuals who appear before it. The COT has, in various cases,
reduced major allegations to secondaries, 16 found major violations
against an institution but not against an individual, 166 and failed to

161.
An important responsibility of the COI is to administer the NCAA enforcement
program. See id. art. 19.1. Administration of the enforcement program includes proposing
legislative changes to the infractions and enforcement process, id. arts. 19.1.3(b) (Duties of
Committee), 19.3, establishing investigative guidelines, id. art. 32.3.1 (Conformance with
Procedures), and overseeing and supervising the secondary violations process, id. arts. 19.5.1
(Penalties for Secondary Violations), 32.3.1.1 (Investigative Procedures; Consultation with
Committee on Infractions). The COI also may grant limited immunity from findings of
involvement in major violations. This includes preserving competition eligibility for a studentathlete when the information otherwise might result in loss of eligibility. Id. art. 32.3.8.
162.
NCAA Bylaw 32.8.8 (Posthearing Committee Deliberations).
163.
Ancillary to its responsibility to resolve cases, the COI oversees scheduling of cases
before it and resolves procedural issues, including those directed at the conduct of enforcement
staff. Procedural matters must be raised prior to or during an infractions hearing or else they are
waived. They are resolved at the hearing, see, e.g., INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 265, supra note 67,
or in a separate hearing preceding the hearing on the merits, see, e.g., INFRACTIONS REPORT NO.
256, supra note 42.
164.
Two other COI responsibilities are to determine whether cases offered for processing
through summary disposition may be so resolved or require a full hearing, NCAA BYLAWS art.
32.7, and to appear before the IAC to respond to appeals. This latter function is handled by the
two COI coordinators of appeals. Id. art. 19.1.1.4.
165.
NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 171 (Mar. 24, 2000)
(Murray State University).
166.
INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 287, supra note 124.
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find some 167 or all1 68 violations that the enforcement staff alleged. The
COI also takes seriously its responsibility to protect the interests of
rules-compliant institutions that are not before it who look to the COJ
to craft penalties that adequately assess the seriousness of violations,
support efforts of diligent compliance directors, and effectively deter
70
violations. 169 The COT has added findings of institutional contro'
and institutional failure to monitor, 171 and in some cases has stated
clearly that it would have made such a finding had the enforcement
72
staff brought the allegation.
2. Conduct of Hearings
As is the case with administrative and other hearings that are
not formal trials, the rules of evidence do not apply at an infractions
hearing. In the absence of subpoena power to compel direct witness
testimony, reliance on hearsay is unavoidable. Some information
comes directly from coaches and other staff members present at the
hearing. For other information, the COJ relies on summaries that the
enforcement staff, institution, and involved individuals provide. At
most hearings there is no factual dispute between an institution and
the enforcement staff, and often there is little or no factual dispute
between them and involved individuals.173 As a rule, the focus of
disagreement is on the weight to be afforded information, inferences
that may be drawn, who has the prime responsibility for violations,
and what penalties are appropriate. To decide whether violations
have been committed, the COJ evaluates, among other things, (1) the
internal consistency, cohesiveness, and logic of an individual's

167. E.g., NCAA DIv. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 248 (Feb. 1,
2006) (Florida A&M University).
168.

E.g., NCAA Div. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT M255 (Chicago

State University) (case dismissed after hearing with no findings of violations).
169.
The COI can add allegations to those presented by the enforcement staff and can
make findings additional to those alleged. NCAA BYLAWS art. 19.4.3 (New Findings). When the

COI believes that new findings may be appropriate, it gives notice to the institution or
individual, provides an opportunity at the hearing to discuss the additional violation, and
provides an opportunity post-hearing for a response in writing. Depending on the nature of the
additional violation, the COI also may provide an opportunity for a supplemental hearing. See id.
170.

E.g., NCAA Div. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 192 (Jan. 31,

2002) (University of Kentucky).
171.
E.g., INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 287, supra note 124; INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 278,
supra note 123.
172.
E.g., INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 193, supra note 136, at 5.
173.
When there is disagreement about what an interview subject said, or meant, the COI
will review the interview transcript and/or listen to a tape of the interview.
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information on each subject about which she provides information, (2)
the consistency of that information compared to other information
provided by the same individual, (3) the consistency of an individual's
information measured against the whole of the information in the
record,
(4) the credibility of individuals providing information,
including whether they have any motive to obfuscate, lie, or withhold
information, (5) any corroborating documentary or physical
information, and, of course, (6) whether any party disputes the
accuracy of the information.
Additionally, the use of confidential source information is a
necessary component of an effective enforcement system and likely
particularly so where there is no subpoena power. Without such
information, many fewer major infractions cases would be identified
and the commission of many major violations would go undiscovered,
to the detriment of all those institutions and individuals who act with
integrity and in compliance with the rules. Reliance on confidential
sources is fundamentally no different from a confidential informer
used in a criminal case or a law firm's use of a private investigator to
follow confidential investigative leads that ultimately produce
information admissible in court. The confidential source's information
typically serves only as a directional signal, leading investigators to
individuals with information both concrete and relevant to a charge.
It is that information, and the identification of those individuals, that
are provided to institutions and involved parties and on which and on
whom the COI relies in making its findings.
In a rare case,
information from a source will be provided to the COI without
attribution when that source is known to the institution and to the
involved individual against whom the information will be used. In
such a case, the COI will consider carefully the extent to which an
institution and involved parties had a meaningful opportunity to "vet"
the information.
3. Institutional and Individual Culpability
One of the least understood aspects of the infractions process
concerns institutional responsibility for violations.
Because
universities act through individuals for whom they are responsible,
when one such individual commits a violation so too does the
university. It does not matter that an institution neither knew nor in
the exercise of due diligence could have known of the violation. The
university's responsibility arises out of its relationship with the rules-
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violating individual. 17 4 Who committed the violation and whether an
institution could have prevented or uncovered it, however, are
relevant to assessment of penalties.
Substantive violations are one thing; they are defined in
specific conduct bylaws. Lack of institutional control, however, is a
separate violation that arises out of affirmative institutional failure to
take appropriate steps to assure rules compliant behavior on the part
of those for whom the institution is responsible. 175 These run the
gamut from a president or chancellor to a booster unknown to an
institution. 176 Except in unusual circumstances, there always is a lack
of institutional control when violations are committed by a high-level
administrator with responsibility for a program and the authority to
administer it.177 There also is a lack of institutional control when a
member institution, through due diligence, should have known about
the commission of violations regardless of who committed them.
Because an institution acts through individuals, findings of
institutional
culpability
necessarily
also
mean
individual
178
culpability.
COT penalties, however, run directly only to an
institution. When individual culpability is significant because of the
nature of the violations or the manner in which they were committed,
the COJ may choose indirectly to penalize a culpable individual
through the show cause process. 179 In that event, an institution
employing such an individual, or seeking to employ him, must impose

174.
Institutional responsibility tracks the law of respondeat superior in which employers
are liable for intentional torts of employees that arise out of the employment relationship when
the employee acts, or intends to act, in furtherance of the employer's interests. 17 CAUSES OF
ACTION 647 § 2 (2009). To some degree, institutional responsibility in NCAA processes also
tracks agency principles. These are based on the general notion that it is unfair for an enterprise
to benefit from work of its agents and yet not be responsible when they cause harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A cmt. a (1958). Under general agency law, a principal is
not responsible when an agent acts solely in his own self interest. Id. By virtue of the
institutional control mandate, NCAA institutions are responsible for the conduct of staff and
others beyond what agency principles dictate.
175.
Institutional control requires member institutions to operate rules-compliant
athletics programs by monitoring to assure compliance, self reporting non-compliance,
cooperating fully in any investigation, and taking appropriate corrective action. NCAA CONST.
art. 2.7. Failure to monitor is a component of institutional control.
176.
INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 193, supra note 136, at 3.
177.
Cf. St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469
(1986).
178.
It is possible, however, to have sufficient information from which to make a finding
of violation against an institution, but not against a particular individual. It also is possible for
the collective conduct of several to equal a major institutional violation, but the separate conduct
of each to be insufficient for a finding of a major violation.
179.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 19.02.1 (Show-Cause Order), 19.5.2.2.1 (Disciplinary Measures).
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penalties as directed by the COI or show cause why it did not, with the
possibility of penalties being imposed on it for failure to follow the
show cause order. 180 For all staff members against whom findings of
violations are made, moreover, whether accompanied by a show cause
order, a file is maintained in the office of the COI. COI staff will share
an individual's infractions history on request from a member
institution at which he is employed or which seeks to employ him.
a. InstitutionalResponsibility and Institutional Control: Comparative
Illustrations
Take the case of Assistant Football Trainer who pays StudentAthlete $100,000.181
No one at his university knows about this
payment. The university conducted more than adequate NCAA rules
education for coaches and staff.
It implemented compliance
procedures reasonably calculated to prevent violations. Compliance
staff followed them and also did adequate follow-through. Despite all
of this, the university committed the violation of paying StudentAthlete because Assistant Football Trainer committed it. There is,
however, no failure to monitor or lack of institutional control by the
university. 182
Now take the same payment, but this time made by Head
Football Coach. Again, the university did everything right. Again, it
committed the violation because Head Football Coach committed it.
But the difference in university responsibility is as different as the
relative positions on the institutional food chain between Assistant
Football Trainer and Head Football Coach. Although a finding of lack
of institutional control is unlikely, it is not out of the realm of
possibility and will depend on other elements of the case.
In a final hypothetical, Head Football Coach again makes the
$100,000 payment to Student-Athlete. This time, Head Football
Coach got the money from Associate Athletics Director who, in turn,
got it from institutional accounts. Athletics Business Manager knew
of the illicit withdrawal. Assistant Football Coach knew how the
180.

See, e.g., INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 287, supra note 124; INFRACTIONS REPORT NO.

270, supra note 114.
181.
Assistant Football Trainer is heir to a fortune worth millions. He is a big fan of the
football team.
182.
To maintain institutional control, member institutions are required to operate
athletics programs that comply with all applicable bylaws, monitor their athletics programs to
assure compliance, self-report instances of non-compliance, cooperate fully in any investigation,
and take appropriate corrective actions. NCAA CONST. art. 2.7. Failure to monitor is one
component of institutional control.
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money was used and reported it to Compliance Director. Compliance
Director talked to Head Football Coach, who denied making the
payment. Compliance Director neither checked records nor conducted
additional interviews. In this third case, again, the institution has
committed the violation of paying Student-Athlete because Head
Football Coach committed it. Institutional responsibility for the
payment is magnified because of the involvement of Associate
Athletics Director and Athletics Business Manager and the absence of
adequate investigation by Compliance Director. In this third case
there also is a gross lack of institutional control.
Student-Athlete in all three cases was the starting quarterback
on the football team. He considered entering the professional football
draft and was projected to be a high first-round draft pick. The
$100,000 kept him in college for another year, a year where the team
under his leadership won its conference championship and a bowl
game. The quarterback was runner-up for the Heisman Trophy.
Paying a student-athlete is a big, big deal, especially when
done to assure that he will remain in school and continue to compete,
paying him $100,000 is even bigger, paying that amount to a star
quarterback is even bigger again. There is no denying that the
violation was substantial.
The responsibility of the Infractions Committee is to make
findings and impose penalties that reflect the magnitude of the
violations in a particular infractions case as well as the degree of
institutional culpability. The responsibility of the Infractions
Committee also is to pay heed to the interests of all member
institutions not before it by, among other things, imposing penalties
that more than offset any competitive or other advantage gained by
rules-violative conduct. In the three illustrations above, the degree of
institutional culpability varies but the competitive advantage gained
is substantial, and a constant. Even in the first situation, where the
institution did everything right (except its hiring of Assistant Football
Trainer) there needs to be at least a vacation of wins and likely
additional penalties assessed. As is obvious, there is an inevitable
tension between the interests of an institution or an individual
involved in a particular infractions case and the interests of the
membership as a whole.
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b. Nature of Violations
Just as in the criminal justice system, NCAA violations can be
characterized as malum in se or malum prohibitum. 183 Malum in se
violations by their nature shout their illicitness (for example, murder
and rape in the criminal justice system; academic fraud or knowingly
competing an ineligible player in the NCAA context). No actor
credibly may claim that he did not know or should not have known
that malum in se conduct was prohibited.
Malum prohibitum
violations are regulatory (for example, speed limits in the criminal
justice system, recruiting calendars in the NCAA context). Even
though a driver may not know that the speed limit in a residential
neighborhood is twenty-five miles per hour, she is expected to know
184
that there is a speed limit and also expected to find out what it is.
In the NCAA world, there is not just an expectation but an affirmative
obligation to know, understand, and comply with NCAA bylaws. 18 A
coach not only knows that there are dead periods in recruiting, 86 for
example, but she is obliged to know precisely when they begin and
end. Lack of knowledge, even if true, is a breach of the obligations of
NCAA membership. Except in the rarest of circumstances, the COI
will reject a claim that not knowing the details of a particular
regulatory bylaw excuses its commission.1 87 Moreover, any such
mitigation will relate only to a coach or staff member, not a member
institution.188

c. Assessment of Culpability
Culpability for a particular substantive violation depends both
on commission of the act (actus reus in the criminal justice system)
and the mental state (mens rea) with which the act was committed.

183.

See, e.g., AM. JUR. CRIM. LAw§ 25 (2010).
184.
In the criminal law, there may be an exceptional case where a regulatory violation is
so far outside what may be anticipated as to be a due process notice problem. See, e.g., Lambert
v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
185.
Such obligations similarly are enforced in regulatory schemes where a specialized
agency oversees compliance. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 3.3, 5.5 (4th ed.
2003).
186.
During a dead period, a coach may neither leave campus for any recruiting purpose
nor have on-campus contact with a prospect. NCAA BYLAWS art. 13.02.4.4.
187.
If commission of a violation clearly was inadvertent and neither produced nor was
intended to produce a significant extra benefit or other advantage, it will have been processed as
a secondary violation.
188.
See, e.g., INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 265, supra note 67.
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Like the criminal law treatment of principals and aiders/abettors,
there may be varying degrees of culpability for NCAA actors engaged
in concerted activity.
Consider a case in which Husband shoots and kills Wife
immediately upon catching her in bed with Paramour. Witness told
Husband of Wife's affair and gave Husband a loaded gun. Husband
immediately raced home and shot Wife. The evidence at trial was that
Witness harbored animus toward Wife, told others before her death
that he would find a way to have her killed, and told others after her
death that he manipulated Husband into doing the deed. On these
facts, Witness acted with purpose to have Wife killed. He also is
complicit in the act of killing because he both instigated it and gave
Husband the gun. Purpose to kill, plus the act of killing results in
first degree-murder.
Husband, however, acted under extreme
emotional distress. His crime may be voluntary manslaughter, not
murder.
NCAA violations are clearly different in kind from crimes, and
even more so from crimes such as murder. What is common both to
crimes and NCAA violations is how degrees of culpability are
assessed. Building on the above example, consider a case where Head
Coach gives cash to Assistant Coach and directs her to give it to
Student-Athlete. Student-Athlete confirms both receipt of the cash
from Assistant Coach and that Head Coach told her it was from him.
According to Assistant Coach, Head Coach told him, falsely, that the
cash was Student-Athlete's and that she left it behind in Head Coach's
office. Head Coach acted with purpose to provide an extra benefit and
also is complicit in the act of providing it. Money to Student-Athlete
plus purpose equals a major extra benefit violation, one made more
serious due to the use of Assistant Coach. Assistant Coach's extra
benefit violation is less serious-perhaps secondary as to him-if, that
is, the COI credits both his rendition of the facts and that he was
fooled.189 Student-Athlete, however, committed a major violation by
accepting the money. The institution is responsible for the acts of
Student-Athlete and both coaches; its responsibility is greater than
that of any individual culpable actor and in no event is it less than
that of Head Coach. Furthermore, even if it cannot be known with
certainty which coach committed the violation, the institution still is

189.
For the definition of a secondary violation, see supra text accompanying note 130.
Should Assistant Coach be found to have committed a major violation, penalties running to his
involvement will be mitigated. See id.
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responsible so long as the evidence is sufficient to show that one of the
coaches committed it.
Consider another example. Due to their misunderstanding of a
rule regarding the number of telephone calls that may be made weekly
to prospects, 190 all coaches on a staff have committed violations. The
violations of each are inadvertent; considered individually by each, the
violations also are not so numerous as to be a recruiting advantage.
Collectively, however, there was an advantage gained. Each coach's
violations may be secondary, but the institution has committed a
major
violation. 191
If, moreover,
the
coaches'
collective
misunderstanding was due to failure of rules education or
misinformation from the compliance director, then institutional
responsibility increases and may constitute a lack of institutional
control-or at least failure to monitor.
4. The COI and Judicial Review
The infractions hearing process is a form of dispute resolution
alternative to the traditional judicial model (alternative dispute
resolution or ADR). 192 It is akin to arbitration in that it works from a
formal agreement of the parties. 193 Arbitration agreements designate
the arbitrator to be used, the specific disputes subject to arbitration,
and the procedures to be employed.
Similarly, NCAA bylaws
designate the COI to handle institutional violations and describe the
COI's role, membership, functions and procedures. 194
As with
decisions of arbitrators, COI decisions are binding on the parties.
Whether formally called arbitration, ADR is most appropriate
when there is a continuing relationship among parties, particularly if
disputes likely will arise regularly and frequently, and more so if there
is a large body of rules to be applied for which a close understanding of
the enterprise and its common understandings is useful, if not critical.
ADR is hardly unique to the NCAA. For example, it is
employed in university disciplinary proceedings, in trade associations,
190.
E.g., NCAA BYLAWS art. 13.1.3.1 (Time Period for Telephone Calls General Rule).
191.
Multiple secondary violations may add up to a major one. Id. art. 19.02.2.1.
192.
See Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights,
Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685 (2004).
193.
NCAA member agreement comes through their adoption of bylaws governing the
enforcement and infractions processes and the obligations of membership.
194.
Parties may agree to use arbitrators that are certified by the American Arbitration
Association. Arbitrators can be standing committees established to handle disputes such as the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the International Council of Arbitration for Sport
(ICAS). They also can be factfinding panels appointed case by case.
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housing associations, and fraternal associations. 195 Arbitration is the
dispute resolution process of choice in collective bargaining
agreements, 196 including salary disputes in professional sports
leagues. It also is used to resolve disputes arising out of national team
and Olympics competition and for drug-testing appeals. 197
The one immutable characteristic of adjudicative bodies is that
they are neutral. Neutrality comes in different shapes and sizes,
however.198 In university disciplinary proceedings, hearing bodies
typically are composed of other staff and faculty.199 When agreements
cover a world of subject matter involving numerous rules and policies

195.

See infra note 200.

196.
See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE COMM'N, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON THE ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE OF MAY-OCTOBER, 1902 (1903). Among others,

arbitration also is employed for claims involving securities. See Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The Supreme Court specifically rejects
the claim that arbitration is inferior to courts in protecting rights of litigants. See, e.g., Green
Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 121 S.Ct. 513 (2000).
197.
See supra note 194. Cases can get complicated. An example is the case of Matt
Lindland. Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass'n, 230 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2000). Lindland wrestled
against Keith Sieracki for a spot on the United States Olympic team. Id. at 1037. The referee
awarded the match win to Sieracki. Id. Lindland protested to the United States Wrestling
Protest Committee, which denied his claim. See id. He then appealed the Protest Committee's
decision to an arbitrator who reversed the decision and ordered a rematch. Id. Lindland won the
rematch. Id. at 1037-38. Thereafter, a second arbitration concluded with a decision in favor of
Sieracki. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, CASE No. 30 190 00483 00, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND
AWARD
(2000),
available
at
http://assets.teamusa.org/assets/documents/attached file/filename/5766/Sieracki v. USA
Wrestling Inc. 2000.pdf. Lindland sued, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the first arbitrator's
decision, which should have resulted in Lindland making the Olympic team. See Lindland, 230
F.3d at 1040. Sieracki sought review by the CAS on grounds that included a "breach of natural
justice." COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, MINUTES OF HEARING, SEPTEMBER 21, 2000
7
(2000). Lindland obtained an injunction ordering Sieracki to comply with the Seventh Circuit
decision. Sieracki withdrew his appeal in response to the injunction. Id. 1 1 8-9. Lindland
competed on the United States team and won a silver medal. See Mitch Sherman, Gardner
Cheered in Lincoln, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Sept. 28, 2000, at 27.
198.
In collective bargaining agreements, including professional sports salary disputes, it
is typical to designate an arbitrator separate from both parties. On the other end of the
spectrum, the Supreme Court found no due process violation in an administrative law judge
serving three separate roles-advocate for each of the parties and also as the decision-maker. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
199.
This is the case even though public universities are state actors subject to the
strictures of minimum due process. Use of member hearing bodies occurs in trade associations.
See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Eric A. Feldman, The
Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World's Premier Fish Market, 94 CAL. L. REV. 313 (2006). In
prison disciplinary proceedings, the hearing body may be comprised of prison officials, even
wardens. See Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571 (1974).
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of an association, a hearing officer typically will have expertise in the
20 0
subject area as well as in the shared customs of the enterprise.
Decisions of arbitrators are afforded great deference by
courts. 20 1 An illustration of just how great this deference is can be
found in the case of Eastern Associated Coal Company, where Eastern
attempted to fire an employee for "just cause," as defined by the
employment contract. 20 2 The employee drove a heavy truck-like
vehicle on public highways. On two separate occasions, he tested
positive for marijuana use. Both times, he was fired. Both time an
arbitrator reinstated him based on the terms of his employment
agreement. Eastern went to court twice in an attempt to overturn the
arbitrator.
On review of the second case, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that mutually agreed terms in a collective
bargaining agreement may include designation of who is to decide the
meaning of contract terms. 203 In the instant case, the parties agreed
that an arbitrator would decide what constituted "just cause" under
the agreement. As a result, the employer got what it bargained forthe
arbitrator's
interpretation-despite
the
fact
that
the
20 4
interpretation was not what it had hoped.
Deference to an arbitrator's interpretation of the terms of an
agreement is by no means unique. The law acknowledges that the
body with jurisdictional authority to adopt rules and policies is the
authoritative voice on their meaning and scope. Federal courts sitting
in diversity apply state law as the state would apply it, not the law

200.
There also is a growing body of commentary questioning whether corporate
governance is best effected by independent directors rather than shareholders. See, e.g., Eric M.
Fogel & Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Independent Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (2007); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market
Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
201.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, an arbitrator's decision can be vacated only if it
came about through corruption or fraud, if the arbitrator was biased or refused to hear relevant
evidence, or if the decision was outside the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a), 11
(2006); see also Hall St. Assocs, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). This includes decisions involving sports arbitration. See, e.g.,
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001). These grounds are
exclusive for actions brought under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. Federal court jurisdiction
under the Act is triggered when the underlying claim is federal. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129
S. Ct. 1262 (2009).
202.
E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57
(2000).
203.
Id.
204.
The Supreme Court decided, also unanimously, that the arbitrator's decision violated
no overarching public policy. Id.

NCAA RULES AND PROCESSES

2010]

they think makes most sense. 205 When a New Jersey court hears a
case based on California law, it applies the law as articulated by the
20 6
California courts; it does not decide what California law should be.
The Supreme Court, hearing a case on appeal from a state court that
involves both state and federal questions, accepts as dispositive the
state court determination of state law.2 0 7 Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, a court hearing an appeal from an agency hearing
decision defers to agency expertise and reverses only when a decision
exceeds statutory authority, is unconstitutional, or is arbitrary or
capricious.

208

Deference to a COT decision was an undercurrent in contract
20 9
litigation between Ohio State University and Jim O'Brien.
Although the trial judge did not like how the COI construed certain
bylaws in the Ohio State infractions case, 210 it nonetheless was clear
that the COI was the authoritative voice on their meaning:
"Ultimately, the determination whether [O'Brien] committed a major
infraction of NCAA rules and what sanctions, if any, may be imposed
upon [Ohio State University] will be made by the NCAA Committee on
21 1
Infractions and not this court."

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
E.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
207.
Under the Supremacy Clause, federal constitutional law and statutes enacted
pursuant to congressional legislative power trump inconsistent state statutes or rules. E.g.,
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
However, the Supreme Court does not revisit a state court's construction of state law. See
Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
208.
The reviewing court sets aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions if they are:
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law;
(2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right;
(4) without observance of procedure required by law;
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to certain provisions of the
APA or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by
the reviewing court.
205.

206.

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
209.
See supra text accompanying notes 41-45 for a discussion of the infractions case.
210.
O'Brien v. Ohio State Univ., 139 Ohio Misc. 2d 36 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2006).
211.
O'Brien v. Ohio State Univ., No. 06AP-946, 2007 WL 2729077, at *16 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 20, 2007).
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XI. FROM CONCEPT OPTIMUM TO IMPLEMENTATION
OPTIMUM
NCAA processes are about as well conceived to achieve NCAA
objectives as can be managed in an imperfect world. There are things
that may be done, however, to move closer to optimum
implementation.
A. Improving the Infractions Process
The COI is a prime actor in NCAA processes to assure that
institutions and those for whom they are responsible comply with
NCAA rules. It also is a focal target of criticism and, increasingly, a
defendant in lawsuits. It is imperative that COT processes best reflect
the needs and predilections of member institutions in creating the COI
and in vesting it with authority to handle institutional violations. It is
equally imperative that COI members, alone and collectively, embody
a level of end-line responsibility, experience, background and gravitas
so as to warrant the significant confidence vested in them by virtue of
service on the COI.
1. Treatment of Institutional Cooperation
Although cooperation is a duty of membership, currently the
COI is obliged by the IAC to specify the degree to which an institution
cooperated in an infractions case and then to mitigate penalties, if
warranted, based on the degree of cooperation. 212 At the most
fundamental level, giving such penalties credit for investigative
cooperation minimizes the gravity of a violation and permits
institutional retention of some part of the benefit achieved through its

212.

See, e.g., NCAA Div. I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMM., INFRACTIONS APPEALS REPORT

No. 208 (Sept. 25, 2003) (University of Michigan); NCAA DIv. I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMM.,
INFRACTIONS APPEALS REPORT No. 175, at 32 (July 16, 2002) (Howard University)
("[Institutional cooperation] must be a significant factor and given substantial weight."); NCAA
Div. I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMM., INFRACTIONS APPEALS REPORT NO. 192 (Sept. 17, 2002)

(University of Kentucky); NCAA DIV. I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMM., INFRACTIONS APPEALS
REPORT NO. 111 (May 1, 1995) (University of Mississippi). In an infraction case involving the
University of Oklahoma, the Infractions Appeals Committee also suggested that the COI should
specify the weight afforded to institutional cooperation. NCAA DIV. I INFRACTIONS APPEALS
COMM., INFRACTIONS APPEALS REPORT NO. 270 (Feb. 22, 2008). As stated by the COI in a report
to the DI Board of Directors, noting and giving credit for cooperation is wrong in principle and
more than problematic in implementation. REPORT ON COMM. ON INFRACTIONS IMPOSITION OF
PENALTIES FOR REVIEW AND ACTION (Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://webl.ncaa.org/web files/

DI MC BOD/DI BOD/2008/October/05,%o20BOD,%20penaltiesmemotoshep.pdf.
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commission. It risks prioritizing effort at the back end-investigating
a violation-over vigilance at the front end-administering an
effective compliance program. Giving penalties credit, moreover,
contradicts a general operating rule in the philosophy of deterrenceto deter, a penalty must do more than merely correct for any injury
created or advantage gained by a violation. Giving penalties credit
also penalizes rules-compliant institutions and complicates the jobs of
diligent campus compliance directors working to maintain a campus
rules-compliant environment.
There are also significant implementation problems with giving
penalties credit for institutional cooperation.
The COT neither
investigates
cases
nor interacts
with institutions
during
investigations. The information on which it bases a finding of a
violation comes from the enforcement staff case summary, responses
from the institution and involved individuals, and the discussion at
the infractions hearing. It is in the nature of these hearings, however,
that information relevant to institutional cooperation is brief,
conclusory,
and inadequate
to permit discrete judgments
distinguishing between degrees of cooperation or the degree to which
penalties mitigation is warranted. 2 13
In consequence, only
extraordinary institutional cooperation can give rise to penalties
credit.
An institution that believes cooperation will result in
mitigation of penalties has raised expectations that lead to
disgruntlement with penalties imposed and more appeals than
otherwise would be taken. Even though the enforcement staff tells
institutions that it neither speaks for the COI nor controls how the
COI will view a case and assess penalties, institutions nonetheless
routinely expect that enforcement staff satisfaction with their efforts
will translate into penalties mitigation. It is likely that no institution
feels that the enforcement/infractions process was completely fair, but
raised expectations only exacerbate discontent.
Giving penalties credit for institutional investigative
cooperation also may trigger claims that personnel actions taken by an
institution against staff were influenced by the desire to mitigate COJ
penalties. The COJ then is in the undesirable position of questioning
institutional motives in admitting culpability and perhaps even the
factual basis for an admission.

213.
There is even less basis for the IAC to find a penalty so excessive as to be an abuse of
discretion. See NCAA BYLAWS art. 32.10.4.1 (Basis for Granting an Appeal: Penalties).
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The potential for institutional cooperation credit also leads to
increased NCAA litigation risk as the enforcement staff and/or the
COI may be pointed to as the allegedly responsible (or co-responsible)
entity for the personnel decision.
Neither the COI nor the
enforcement staff can speak with authority as to the reasons
motivating institutional personnel actions, and, in fact, it is possible
that neither would endorse the action taken. Defending a lawsuit
always means lawyer fees and litigation costs. The COI must do what
it believes is right based on the record before it and the threat or
actuality of a lawsuit should not deter its informed and thoughtful
decision-making. For the reasons set forth above, however, giving
credit for investigative cooperation on the merits is a bad idea. At the
very least, it is a debatable policy choice. That it increases litigation
risk, therefore, should tip the scales against its use.
There is a concern that failure to give penalties credit for
cooperation eliminates one of the few tools that the enforcement staff
has to spur institutional cooperation and aggravates the political
difficulties that senior institutional administrators may face with
various constituencies in getting a full and complete investigation
done. Without discounting either concern, it is likely that no more
than a few institutions will fail to take seriously their obligation to
investigate thoroughly even in the absence of a penalties mitigation
incentive, as it is in an institution's interests to weed out cheaters and
staff members whose work is below par. For those institutions that
drag their metaphorical feet, a stick should be wielded in lieu of the
carrot. In other words, the enforcement staff can and should allege
institutional failure to cooperate when it occurs. This allegation
should be an effective impetus to institutional cooperation,
particularly if the enforcement staff is aggressive in making the
allegation when full cooperation is not forthcoming, or is forthcoming
but slow. 2 14 Yet another spur comes from the COT's independent
obligation to inquire of institutions should the record suggest that
they did not do all they could or should have done to investigate
violations or to assist the enforcement staff in its investigation. If the
COI is not persuaded that a full investigation was done, it has several
options: (1) it can enhance penalties for violations found, (2) it can
direct the staff to do further investigation with the possibility of

214.
Delay can be significant not simply because of the impact on an enforcement staff
investigation. It may have impact on an involved individual. It also increases the overall time for
a case to go from notice of inquiry to COI decision and report. Institutions evaluating the process
will not know that delays were caused by a dilatory institution and not staff inefficiencies.
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alleging further violations, or (3) it can itself make additional
21
allegations and finding of violations.
Because of the position that the IAC has taken with regard to
crediting and noting institutional investigative cooperation,2 16 the COI
cannot on its own effect a change in current practice. What is needed
is explicit bylaw language that eliminates (or at a minimum narrowly
restricts the use of) penalties credit for institutional investigative
cooperation.
2. Let the Punishment Fit the "Crime"
There are at least two needed reforms to how the Infractions
Committee assesses penalties that may be implemented by the
217Infractions Committee with no need for legislative authority
ratcheting up the penalties imposed in infractions cases and imposing
penalties based on the magnitude of the entire case rather than only
imposing penalties tagged to the particular violations committed (as,
for example, limiting team play/practice for a play/practice violation).
A prime, but by no means exclusive, reason for increasing
penalties is that at present they are less severe than those imposed by
Team CAP for failure to meet the academic progress rate. Deficient
academic performance is a bad thing, committing major infractions no
less so. It is unacceptable for Team CAP penalties for academic
deficiencies to be more severe than those imposed by the Infractions
2 18
Committee for major rules violations.
It is clear, moreover, that only certain penalties are perceived
by coaches and others as substantial and, thereby, announce to them
the seriousness of the violations committed.
For coaches, what
matters most is vacation of wins from their individual records and
show cause orders by which restrictions on their athletically related

215.
For instances when additional violations were found, see supra notes 156-63 and
accompanying text.
216.
E.g., Infractions Appeals Committee Report No. 294) (Florida State University 2010)
at 11.
217.
Other penalties, such as a ban on television appearances, likely require some formal
action by the NCAA membership. A TV ban currently is authorized; NCAA BYLAWS art.
19.5.2.2(g) (Disciplinary Measures), 19.5.2.5 (Television Appearance Limitations; and would be a
significant penalty perceived as such. Because the COI has not imposed this penalty for several
years, however, prudence dictates that the membership in some form reaffirm support for its
imposition.
218.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 23.02.1 (Academic Progress Rate). A complete description of the
process by which teams are penalized is found in NCAA BYLAWS art. 23 (Academic Performance
Program).
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duties follow them to a new hiring institution.219 Of those penalties
currently imposed on institutions, loss of scholarship, loss of
competition opportunities, particular post-season, and vacation of
wins matter most. 220 The COI needs to modify its practice of imposing
penalties as a "tit for tat" focused on the nature of particular
violations.
A case is major because violations were committed
intentionally or because they are numerous. A case is major because
it results in a competitive or other advantage to an institution. In all
but extraordinary circumstances, a major case also should result in
penalties commensurate with the magnitude of the case taken as a
221
whole.
3. Settlement Decisions
In a multi-member association, litigation decisions can be
difficult to manage.
Lawyer work product and lawyer-client
communication require confidentiality, but there also is an obvious
need to have the members direct litigation decisions. In walking this
line, NCAA senior administrators give full information to the NCAA
executive committee; which makes client litigation decisions,
including settlements, on behalf of all members; and provide some
level of information to the DI Board of Directors and Leadership and
Legislative Councils.
NCAA settlement decisions are based on the same criteria as in
other contexts involving institutional litigants. These include the cost
to litigate, the cost to settle, the centrality of the subject matter of
litigation to the operation of the enterprise, the impact of litigation
loss on continuing operations, and the risk that a settlement will
generate more litigation. The COT receives regular reports on the
progress of litigation involving it, but it does not routinely have formal
input in litigation decisions. Consistent with other NCAA litigation,
the membership as a whole is treated as the client and the COI has no
special status. This process needs tweaking.
The COI is the most familiar with the various components of a
case and what occurred. It is in the best position to assess the impact
of a settlement on future cases and on how it does its work. It may
suggest settlement language that will better protect those interests

219.
220.

NCAA BYLAWS art. 19.5.2.2 (e) and (1).
NCAA BYLAWS art. 19.5.2.1 (e) and (f; NCAA BYLAWS art. 19.5.2.2 (e), (h), (i), and

221.

NCAA BYLAWS art. 19.5.2.2. (c).
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than that which otherwise might result. In addition, committee
service involves a considerable amount of time and work, all of it on a
volunteer basis. A settlement that undoes all that work because a
litigation decision is focused too heavily on the economic advantage of
settling may have adverse effect on COT processes and member
morale. COT perspective and predilections need not be dispositive, but
its views should be heard. It also should be informed as to how
competing factors were assessed in coming to a litigation decision,
especially one to settle.
4. Committee Composition
The work of the COI is among the most important done by any
NCAA committee, cabinet, or council: it has substantial import for
institutions and involved individuals alleged to have committed
violations and substantial import for institutions looking to it to
uphold competitive equity and protect against an onrush of cheating
and other behaviors injurious to student-athletes and institutional
integrity.
Appearing before the COI are senior institutional
administrators, including presidents, chancellors, regents, and general
counsel. Power coaches appear. Experienced lawyers appear. The
latter may be unfamiliar with infractions hearings processes and urge,
sometimes at great length, that processes comport with those with
which they are familiar. COI cases periodically end in litigation.
Litigation awards may be substantial. The NCAA also may incur
substantial attorney fees even in cases where ultimately no NCAA
liability is found.
a. Who?
There are eight COI members who hear and decide cases; an
222
additional two members are coordinators of appeals to the IAC.
There are no stated bylaw criteria for membership on the hearing
committee except that at least two members must be women and two
must be members of the public unaffiliated with a member
institution. 223 Service on the COI is not simply a matter of knowing
"the stuff' and putting in the requisite time. These are critically
necessary but far from sufficient conditions. COI members entrusted
to deal with sensitive and important subject matter need to have the

222.

NCAA BYLAWS art. 19.1.1 (Composition of Committee).

223.

Id.
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gravitas and stature that lends credence to decisions rendered. Prior
to the Tarkanian 224 reforms, members of the COI always were
prominent in their fields, with end-line, significant, and broad-based
responsibilities and experience. There must be continued assurance
that members have the experience that comes with superior analytical
skills, such as professors with tenure, athletic directors, and general
counsels of universities." Embodying these criteria in bylaw language
would guarantee continued adherence to them and also to avoid the
inefficiency that comes with conferences nominating for COI service
225
individuals with no possibility of being appointed.
b. For How Long?
Most committee appointments are for four-year terms with reappointment to another four years. 226 On most NCAA committees,
members represent the conference that nominates them; if a
committee member switches jobs to an institution in another
conference, she may serve another four and four. A member of the
COI, by contrast, represents neither conference nor institution. The
initial appointment is for a three-year term, with two three-year re22 7
appointments.
Term limits assure the periodic injection of new perspectives on
the COI.228 They also reduce issues of a member's continuing tenure

224.
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). Tarkanian, the head men's basketball
coach at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), was suspended by UNLV after the COI
found that he had committed major violations. He sued the NCAA, claiming he was denied due
process in the infractions hearing. Although Tarkanian did not prevail in the litigation (the
Supreme Court held that the NCAA is not a state actor and, therefore, under no requirement to
provide due process at hearings), the NCAA subsequently appointed a "blue-ribbon" panel to
evaluate the enforcement and infractions processes. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO REVISE THE NCAA ENFORCEMENT AND INFRACTION PROCESSES (1991) (on

file with the author). The committee was chaired by former solicitor general Rex Lee and had as
members a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and a former U.S. attorney general. Most
of the recommendations thereafter were adopted. Compare NCAA BYLAWS art. 19.2 (1993), with
NCAA BYLAWS art. 19.2 (1994).
225.
Although unstated criteria in the past has resulted in individuals with the requisite
experience serving on the COI, absence of such explicitly stated criteria means that conferences
have not limited nominations to such individuals. Stating the criteria explicitly therefore also
would avoid inefficiencies in the committee nominating process.
226.
E.g., NCAA BYLAWS arts. 21.2.1.2 (Term of Office), 21.4..6 (Term of Office).
227.
Id. art. 19.1.1.3 (Term of Office).
228.
Another benefit is that wholesale and abrupt change in the COI, caused by
resignations before the end of terms, will not result in few experienced members serving. These
resignations result in skewed composition in the long term as too many will complete their terms
at the same time.
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on the committee despite any problems with her. Were bylaws to be
amended to permit reappointment after three three-year terms but
only after a three-year interval, both interests would be met and the
downsides to term limits also avoided. 229 Term limits also carry
significant disadvantage as they deprive groups of members no matter
how valuable and have negative impact on the experience of a group.
These consequences can be aggravated if members resign before
completing their full terms. A salutary reform to COI term limits
would be to permit reappointment after three three-year terms, but
only after a three-year interval. This option preserves the opportunity
to assure requisite experience on the COT but permits the decision to
be made unfettered by a natural reluctance to refuse to reappoint a
sitting member who seeks to continue to serve.
B. Improving the Enforcement Process
There was a growing feeling up to and through the time of the
Tarkanian reforms that the enforcement and infractions processes
operated in ways that were fundamentally unfair to member
institutions and staff.2 30 One offshoot of the Tarkaniancase was that
NCAA infractions processes were reformulated to provide minimum
due process procedural protections. 2 3 1 Another offshoot involved
rethinking the role of the enforcement staff so that it became more
user-friendly.2 32 A change in enforcement staff role identity and
approach was an important reform at the time. 23 3
Because an
institution and involved individuals are obliged to cooperate and to
tell all, the theory was that the enforcement staff should have some
reciprocal duty to cooperate. It is well past time to rethink this
approach.
There are advantages to a system in which the enforcement
staff works in tandem with institutions under investigation for
commission of major infractions. In principle, such a system is fully
consistent with the overarching mission of NCAA staff to assist
member institutions. Of prime importance to institutions is that
working with the enforcement staff to uncover facts honors their
229.
Left to the sound discretion of the membership would be decisions whether to reappoint a particular member after a three-year interval in light of other candidates for service
and the overall configuration of the COI.
230.
See generally, supra note 224 discussing Tarkanian reforms.

231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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integrity. It signals that they still are trusted members in their
association
notwithstanding
the
commission
of
violations.
Cooperative investigations also offer institutions an outside lens into
evaluating the seriousness of what occurred.
In practice, cooperative investigations are efficient. They can
facilitate a quest for all relevant facts while at the same time not
impede the enforcement staff from making independent fact
assessments
and deciding what allegations are warranted.
Duplicative effort is avoided, or at least minimized. For individuals
being interviewed-including those who are not suspected of
committing violations-burdens on their time may be alleviated. The
gain for the enforcement staff is that institutional shared
responsibility of an investigation may bring more diligent institutional
effort, or at least a more open, and thus less defensive, attitude toward
NCAA enforcement staff. Institutional compliance staff is better
situated to find and arrange for staff and student-athlete interviews.
They are the ones who, in any event, will need to gather relevant
records and other documents. They know and understand campus
personalities and may offer guidance as to how best to approach
individuals. These acknowledged advantages cannot be discounted.
Nonetheless, they are outweighed by the disadvantages.
When the enforcement staff first put on its cooperative hat,
coach participation in infractions hearings was nonexistent. Before
Tarkanian, a coach might not have known she was under
investigation or even that a finding was made that she had committed
violations.23 4 That day has long since passed. An enforcement staff
investigation in which institutions are heavily involved has practical
consequences for coaches and has the appearance of prejudging
circumstances in favor of institutions.
In addition, cooperative
investigations pose a risk that the enforcement staff may lose
objectivity and identify too closely with institutional staff. Not calling
adversarial that which clearly is adversarial, moreover, fosters
misunderstanding, or at least permits claims of misunderstanding, of
just what the enforcement staffs role is.
There also may be
institutional unhappiness that the COI is not sufficiently deferential
to conclusions jointly reached by the institution and enforcement staff
after a cooperative investigation effort.
To describe the risks and disadvantages in investigations that
are cooperative is not to suggest that the enforcement staff abdicates
its role to make an independent assessment of the facts and to bring
234.

See generally sources cited supra note 224.
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allegations that those facts warrant. Nor is it to suggest that the
enforcement staff operates to the detriment of coaches or that
investigations are biased against them. On the contrary, 23 5 the
enforcement staff does a laudable investigative job, acts with
independence and integrity, and makes every effort to be evenhanded
with institutions and involved individuals. Describing the risks and
disadvantages also is not to imply that coaches and involved
individuals are similarly situated with institutions in ways of import
to the efficient processing and security of an investigation. There
clearly are differences between coaches and other involved individuals
and institutional staff who are not the subject of an investigation
when it comes to incentives to subvert or delay an investigation,
influence witness recollection or statements, or otherwise act in bad
faith.
No wholesale departure from current practice is required. The
enforcement staff still could alert the COI to exculpatory information
regarding allegations, choose to assist institutions and involved
individuals to locate witnesses and facilitate interviews, and conduct
joint investigations with institutions, just with more care as to when
joint actions are appropriate. What must be clear and explicitly stated
in the Division I manual is that the primary role of the enforcement
staff is adversarial and its willingness to assist and cooperate with
institutions and involved individuals is secondary to the main job.
1. Maintaining Distance
Enforcement staff members naturally feel good about
institutional staff members with whom they work closely and who
spend long hours to facilitate their investigation. They naturally feel
bad about building a case against an institution out of information
acquired only through the assistance of institutional staff. This is
particularly true regarding allegations such as failure to monitor and
lack of institutional control that point to shortcomings in compliance
staff, the very ones with whom the enforcement staff works most
closely.
The risks to the process are that enforcement staff
cooperation with an institution may be seen to compromise their
independent judgment or to lead to preferential treatment for
institutions to the detriment of the interests of coaches and other
involved individuals. Most institutional staff members are dedicated

235.
Compare, e.g., NCAA v. Yeo, 114 S.W.3d 584 (Tex. App. 2003), with NCAA v. Yeo,
171 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2005).
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to doing their jobs well and ethically. But even good people make
mistakes, may be cowed by a strong personality, or on occasion
succumb to temptation and do bad things. The risk to the process is
that the enforcement staff will exalt (or be perceived to exalt) effort
and diligence of compliance staff in investigating violations over
failure of effort and diligence in preventing and uncovering them. The
risk is that the enforcement staff will give too much credit for good
intentions and not enough demerits for inadequate follow-through.
Because the enforcement and infractions processes operate in a world
where competitive equity needs are paramount, lenient treatment for
one institution has consequence for others. Too close a working
relationship with one institution risks myopia regarding how decisions
may bear on, or be perceived to bear on, institutions not under
investigation.
2. A Rose by Any Other Name: Calling the Process Adversarial
NCAA bylaws describe the role of the enforcement staff and the
procedures by which it does its job. 23 6 Nowhere in the bylaws is the
job explicitly described as adversarial; only by necessary inference
from its role as investigator and presenter of cases to the COI does its
role become clear. Calling the process adversarial would not by itself
increase the distance between the enforcement staff and institutions,
but it would move in that direction.
It is one thing for the enforcement staff, where possible, to
attempt to assist both institutions and involved individuals to locate
witnesses or otherwise to track down information.
It is mere
sophistry, however, to describe as non-adversarial an enforcement
staffs investigation, its allegations, its collection of evidence in
support of violations, its determination that involved individuals lied
or obfuscated, or that institutional staff failed to meet the requisites of
monitoring and control.
The enforcement staffs presentation to the COI in support of
its allegations of violations is also adversarial.
Clearly and
necessarily, the enforcement staff takes an adversarial posture in
investigation when it encounters reluctance to provide information,
when it is concerned about the security of information if shared with
an institution or involved individual, or even when it tests information
already provided to assure it is complete and accurate. However much
the enforcement staff and institution work together, in the end, the

236.

See generally NCAA BYLAWS arts. 19 & 32.
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enforcement staff must bring allegations and present the information
that supports them. In essence, if not in name, doing so makes the
process adversarial. This is no less true even though in most cases the
institution agrees that violations occurred.
Calling the process adversarial avoids involved individualsand, at times, institutions-misunderstanding the role of the
enforcement staff. Currently, hearing time, and sometimes quite a bit
of it, is devoted to arguments that an allegation should be dropped
because the enforcement staff failed in what is argued, wrongly, as its
duty to track down all investigative leads and interview all witnesses
with potential exculpatory information. The underpinning of the
criticism is that it is the obligation of the enforcement staff, and not
institutions and involved individuals, to make the case for exculpation
or mitigation. Obviously, the same enforcement staff that decides
violations were committed and that presents evidence in support of
this fact also cannot have an equal responsibility to refute that
evidence. NCAA bylaws need to say that clearly.
Another problematic aspect of viewing an enforcement staff
role as cooperative, and not adversarial, is the extent to which doing
so prevents proactive investigation of institutions and coaches. It may
never be politically feasible for the enforcement staff to mirror the
police by, for example, formally targeting repeat institutional
offenders or by using undercover agents.
Under the present
articulation of its role, however, even other initiatives-sharing
information with the police so that they might use their full
investigative tools and then, in turn, share information with the
237
enforcement staff-may go untried.

237.
Among these might be sharing with law enforcement information of violations that
threaten the integrity of the college game where the absence of subpoena power and
investigative tools such as wiretaps prevents the enforcement staff from making a case. The
enforcement staff currently does some things. It identifies "top prospects" in various sports and
interviews them about the recruitment process. E-mail from David Price, NCAA, Vice President
for Enforcement, to Josephine R. Potuto, Richard H. Larson Professor of Constitutional Law,
University of Nebraska -Lincoln College of Law (Nov. 30, 2009, 18:11:14 CST) (on file with
author). The AGA enforcement staff attends summer basketball events at least in part to observe
agent and coach interaction and to build relationships with coaches, agent/runners, scouting
services, and media representatives. E-mail from Rachel Newman Baker, to Josephine R. Potuto,
Richard H. Larson Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Nebraska -Lincoln College of
Law (Nov. 30, 2009, 22:22:29 CST) (on file with author).
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3. Remember the Coaches
Infractions cases frequently involve allegations that coaches
and other involved individuals committed violations. 23 8 Yet, the
enforcement staff interacts with them neither in the same way nor on
the same time line as it does with institutions.
There are various and good reasons for the differences. A
constant in all investigations is that the side making the case
necessarily works in advance and independent of the side responding.
To avoid collusion among those investigated, their corruption of
evidence and influencing of witnesses, investigators seek to complete
an investigation before sharing information with those under
investigation. An institution suspected of committing major violations
starts on the investigative side of the ledger by investigating whether
violations occurred and only moves to the defensive side when it
responds to a Notice of Allegations. In many cases, an institution will
have begun an investigation before the enforcement staff comes to
campus. At least at the beginning of its investigation, then, the
enforcement staffs investigation is intertwined with that of the
institution; its initial steps may be to confirm information already
provided. In addition, the enforcement staff needs to work with an
institution, at least to arrange interviews and to review and collect
documentary evidence. In contrast, an individual will likely not have
independently begun an investigation until receipt of the notice of
allegations that names him as having committed violations.
Another significant difference between the enforcement staffs
investigation of institutions and of coaches is that an institution acts
through its staff but also is independent from them. An institution
under investigation may have staff members who are involved
individuals but will have many more staff members who are not. A
coach under investigation for violations is always an involved
individual.
Yet another difference is that an institutional presentation
necessarily is more encompassing than that of an involved individual.
The institution is responsible for all violations; the individual is
involved only in certain allegations. The institution must provide full
documentation of its processes and corrective actions. An involved
individual has no such need.

238.
2006).

See generally, e.g., O'Brien v. Ohio State Univ., 139 Ohio Misc. 2d 36 (Ohio Ct. C1.
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With that said, there are various and good reasons for being
wary of a process in which one of the parties has early involvement
with an investigation while the other does not. Often, allegations are
finalized and relevant information is determined before an institution
submits its formal response to a Notice of Allegations and on occasion
even before a Notice of Inquiry issues. 239 The result is that an
institution may have investigated violations and formulated its
position for months or even years before the Notice of Allegations
issues. While a coach or other involved individual has general
knowledge of an investigation and may begin his independent
investigation at any point, the reality is that much of his investigation
will be conducted in the ninety-day response period that begins after
the Notice of Allegations issues. 240 Different treatment does not mean
unfair treatment. Nonetheless, coaches often argue that different
treatment is unfair treatment.
A much more significant issue with how an investigation
proceeds is that, by the time the Notice of Allegations issues, the
enforcement staff has developed a fairly firm picture of the violations
that were committed, by whom, and how. As a result, it can be
difficult for a coach to inject his views into the process and particularly
difficult for him to identify what relevant information may have been
missed that he-or the enforcement staff in pursuit of a full pictureneeds to pursue.
Although the enforcement staff may go to
considerable effort to assist a coach to locate and interview witnesses
and pursue relevant information, the post-investigation timing of the
assistance is an impediment. In requesting assistance, moreover, a
coach often may not be able to specify with concreteness what
information he hopes to obtain, making it unlikely for the
investigators to grant him assistance. 241 This problem, combined with
the perception that there is uneven treatment, points to a general

239.
The process by which an infractions investigation begins is set forth in NCAA
BYLAWS art. 32.5. A notice of inquiry issues once the enforcement staff has "reasonably reliable
information" that violations have been committed. NCAA BYLAWS art. 32.5.1. A notice of
allegations reflects the enforcement staffs conclusion there is sufficient information on which
findings of major violations may be made. Id. art. 32.6.1.1.1. Universities and individuals
charged with the commission of violations then have ninety days to submit written responses. Id.
art. 32.6.5. The enforcement staff thereafter conducts pre-hearing conferences designed to
narrow remaining issues. Id. art. 32.6.6. The enforcement staff then issues its case summary.
The case summary sets forth the current allegations, the evidence on which the enforcement
staff relies, and, briefly, the position of the parties. Id. art. 32.6.7. The case then goes to hearing
before the COI. See id.
240.
When it is not, the COI may grant extensions. Id. arts. 32.6.5, 32.6.8.
241.
See INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 265, supra note 67, at app. 3.
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need to revisit the role of the enforcement staff to assure that it lands
at the appropriate policy place with regard to when and in what
circumstances it works with an institution to acquire the facts to be
used to build its case. A couple of matters seem clear.
When initiating an investigation, NCAA enforcement staff
often know compliance staff from the member institutions and are
generally familiar with the good work that the great majority of
compliance directors do. That familiarity emphatically does not lead
the enforcement staff to exonerate institutional staff without inquiry.
Nonetheless, prior familiarity, combined with working with staff on a
particular case, requires extra vigilance to avoid the appearance of
pre-judging behavior to be rules-compliant and monitoring to have
been sufficient. 242 Additionally, the enforcement staff needs to be
particularly sensitive to situations where compliance staff and an
involved individual are both parties to a circumstance relevant to a
finding of violation or when there is a factual dispute about the level
of monitoring activity. In these situations, compliance staff members
are adversaries to involved individuals when articulating the facts of a
violation and, thus, compliance staff should not be present during
interviews related to the violation. 243 Other institutional staff also
should not be present or, if present, must be admonished not to
disclose what was said to the compliance staff person whose
information is contested.
Finally, care should be exercised in the inclusion of information
in an enforcement staff case summary. In its response to a Notice of
Allegations, an institution will describe and summarize information
relevant to its conclusion that a violation was or was not committed.
In preparing its case summary, the enforcement staff does likewise.
In many cases, much of the information will be the same. There may
be a temptation, therefore, for the enforcement staff to adopt as its
own the facts set forth in the institution's response, including
inferences drawn from them. Because it is and must be the exclusive
responsibility of the enforcement staff to make the case for violations
and to stand behind the allegations and the evidence supporting them,
any such practice raises questions. Were the enforcement staff to
follow such a practice, it should only rely on the institutional response
when it can independently confirm the accuracy of the information so
that it has an independent basis for concluding that it is credible. To
protect the record, moreover, the enforcement staff should include an
242.
243.

Id.
Id.
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explicit statement regarding its independent confirmation that the
information is accurate and that it supports findings of violations.
Even so, to avoid the perception of bias, the practice should only be
employed when there is no involved individual in a case.
4. Limited Subpoena Power
As discussed previously, the general use of subpoena power is
inappropriate to the NCAA's enforcement and infractions processes
and would be of little assistance to the enforcement staff in
investigating a case.
There are two possible exceptions where
subpoena power may be helpful and not unduly intrusive.
One exception is when an individual with significant
information has brought a civil lawsuit, spoken to the media, or
otherwise made public statements about institutional violations.
Because he already voluntarily has shared the information, any
argument about the intrusiveness of NCAA enforcement processes is
diminished. A second exception runs to former student-athletes and
staff members no longer employed by an NCAA institution who may
have been complicit in violations, either through committing them or
by failing to report them when they still had a formal institutional
association. When they were at the institution, they were obliged to
be rules-compliant and to report when they had information about
violations. It seems not unreasonable to use subpoena power to hold
them to an obligation on which they defaulted.
5. Failure to Cooperate as its Own Case
The cooperative principle is a foundational obligation of NCAA
membership. Institutional failure to cooperate in an investigation is
not only among the most serious institutional violations but also is
independent of any conduct violations that may have been committed.
Because appropriate fact circumstances so far have not arisen,
however, to failure to cooperate has not been the sole foundation of a
major infractions case.
Should an institution stonewall or be half-hearted in assisting
the enforcement staff to obtain information from boosters, former
student-athletes, and others, a case may never be made.
Recalcitrance translates into a double bonus-no finding of culpability
for the underlying conduct violations and no finding of failure to
cooperate. An institution should not be able to avoid violations by
committing another, perhaps greater, violation. Instead, when it has
reasonable cause to believe an institution is not cooperating, the
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enforcement staff should allege and bring a failure to cooperate case
on its own footing. It should not matter that the enforcement staff can
only speculate as to the scope and nature of conduct violations it seeks
to investigate when its inability to gather information is stymied by
an institution's breach of its membership obligations.
6. Former Student-Athletes, 244 Disassociation, and Institutional
Obligations
The enforcement staffs potential use of the subpoena power
against a former student-athlete who refuses to cooperate with an
investigation faces countervailing policy considerations regarding
whether use of subpoena power ever is appropriate.
These
considerations do not apply to a penalty of disassociation, which is a
penalty that bans a former student-athlete from any contact 245 with a
specific athletics program or staff.246 As with institutions and the
failure to cooperate, disassociation has been imposed only in the
context of a major infractions case brought on the basis of conduct
violations. Independent of bringing a major infractions case, however,
the enforcement staff should direct an institution to disassociate a
former student-athlete who refuses to cooperate in an investigation on
the exclusive basis of that refusal.
The way it would work is that the enforcement staff would
make contact with a former student-athlete. If she refused to be
interviewed, the enforcement staff would give notice that it will allege
a failure to cooperate whose consequence will be institutional
disassociation until she interviews with the enforcement staff. If she
still declines to cooperate, the enforcement staff will bring the
allegation and send it both to the former student-athlete and

244.
For ease of discussion, this Article refers only to former student-athletes. What is
said, however, applies equally to former staff members and, to some extent, to boosters. Boosters
have neither a duty to cooperate nor a right to associate with an athletics program. Just as with
former student-athletes and staff, their failure to cooperate should result in disassociation even
if a major infractions case cannot be brought.
245.
Contact with a team can include invitation to athletics events, provision of tickets by
staff, walking the sidelines at a game, formal recognition during a game, and attending alumni
functions.
246.
When a former student-athlete is being investigated for the commission of a
violation while a student, what additionally should be considered is treating the failure to
respond to the allegation as an admission by silence of that violation. If she competed while
ineligible because of the violation, her individual records could be vacated as well as team
records for those contests. Her relationship to the institution and obligation when there to have
been rules-compliant should permit such a result. A full airing of what might be done, and how,
requires more analysis than I can do here.
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institution. The only showing the enforcement staff would need to
make is that it has reason to believe a former student-athlete has
information about violations committed while she was a studentathlete at the institution and that the former student-athlete has
refused to cooperate. As with any other NCAA process, the right to
respond to the allegation vests only in the institution.
There are three alternatives for what comes next. If the
institution met its obligation under the cooperative principle to try to
get the former student-athlete to cooperate and does not challenge the
disassociation directive, it can disassociate the former student-athlete
and the case is over. If it met its obligation under the cooperative
principle but believes disassociation is unwarranted, it can appeal the
enforcement staffs disassociation directive to the COI on an expedited
record. To effectuate the second of these alternatives, explicit bylaw
authority may be needed. If the institution did not meet its obligation
under the cooperative principle, then a failure to cooperate allegation
should be brought against it, and the major infractions case against
the institution and the former student-athlete will be heard at the
247
same time.
The threat of disassociation may prompt cooperation in only a
few cases.
Nonetheless, those few are better than none.
Disassociation, moreover, is at least a public expression that the
enforcement staff does all that it can to investigate possible NCAA
violations.
7. Approach to Secondaries
When a coach engages in intentional rules-violative conduct
regarding a well-understood bylaw, there should be a virtually
irrebuttable presumption that the conduct was intended to gain a
recruiting or competitive advantage.
Consider recruiting in
particular. In a world bound by finites, coaches can devote only so
much time to recruiting. A coach who intentionally exceeds contact
limits will do so with elite athletes predicted to be difference makers.
What coaches repeatedly say is that successful recruiting is all about
building relationships. For that reason, and also to protect studentathlete well-being, NCAA bylaws limit the number of "contacts" 2 48 a

247.
As a non-member, a former student-athlete would have no right to appear at the
hearing.
248.
In NCAA parlance, "contact" is a term of art and means a "face-to-face encounter."
NCAA BYLAWS art. 13.02.3 (Contact). It is not a phone call or electronic message or an
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coaching staff may have with a prospect and his family, and during
what periods he may have them. 249 Collectively, 25 0 coaches say that a
prohibited additional in-person contact is a significant recruiting
advantage. If, by virtue of the violation, a prospect is prevented from
attending an institution, 251 the institution should suffer scholarship
loss in addition to loss of the prospect. If the prospect still may attend
the institution, then the institutional penalty should be even greater.
If governing bylaws regarding secondary violations do not presently
permit sufficiently substantial penalties, then there needs to be
legislative change to make this happen, with the opportunity for an
institution to appeal to the COI should it believe that the penalties are
too severe. The appeals process would track the appeals process used
in secondary cases when the penalty imposed is a fine.
C. Improving Reinstatement
Even in an imperfect world, aspects of the reinstatement
process need to be improved. It is critical that all member institutions
feel confident that each member institution submitting a
reinstatement request has conducted a careful review of the
underlying facts and submitted a full and fully forthcoming fact
rendition in support of the reinstatement request. They also need to
know that behaviors providing recruiting or competitive advantage
are treated with sufficient severity to deter the behavior. When a
student-athlete competes while ineligible because of bad information
or soft treatment, all other teams in the sport are affected. Coaches
also may be affected as their win/loss records predict raises and even
252
whether they retain their jobs.
Contrary to these needs, the current reinstatement process
produces serious and perverse consequences by rewarding obfuscation
and deception. Universities with staffs who play by the rules are

observation of a prospect's athletics performance. In this Article, I use it more generally to cover
all these.
249.
See, e.g., id. arts. 13.1.2.1 (Permissible Recruiters; General Rule), 13.1.3.1 (Time
Period for Telephone Calls General Rule), 13.1.4 (Recruiting Calendars), 13.1.6 (Contacts).
250.
And singly, except when a particular coach is the one who committed the violation.
Then, the tune sung is different.
251.
For the reason why this might happen, see infra text accompanying notes 252-58.
252.
See, e.g., James Brandenburg, W4KU Fires Head Football Coach David Elson,
WBKO.coM, Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.wbko.com/news/headlines/69568572.html;
Tabby
Soignier, Western Kentucky's Rocky Transition to FCS Ends in Coach's Firing,MONROE NEWS
STAR, Nov. 10, 2009, available at http://www.thenewsstar.com/article/20091110/SPORTS/
91109025/1006/sports.
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adversely, albeit indirectly, affected by soft reinstatement treatment
as they are unlikely to benefit from soft treatment. Similarly, those
who perform thorough investigations and submit full and fullyforthcoming reports are most likely to be disadvantaged competitively
because they are more likely to present facts that adversely affect a
player's competition eligibility.
A major cause of these consequences is that the current
reinstatement process assigns penalties based solely on the degree of
student-athlete culpability. This approach is inadequate because it
ignores (1) the substantial competitive or recruiting advantage that
may have been gained, or perceived to have been gained, (2) the
degree of intentional coach involvement, (3) the message sent to-or at
least received by-coaches at other schools about the rewards of rules
non-compliance, and (4) the concomitant difficulties posed to
compliance staff.
The current reinstatement approach is most problematic when
applied to recruiting. When a prohibited recruiting contact takes
place, the coach has committed a violation in which a prospect was
involved. Either, neither, or both may have intended the violation.
The recruiting advantage, however, is a constant. As a penalty for a
prohibited contact, the reinstatement committee has authority to bar
a prospect from attending the coach's institution while leaving her free
to attend any of the other 335 Division I institutions.
The
Reinstatement Committee virtually never imposes this penalty,
believing that it unfairly hinders a student's choice of university and
athletics program. Reinstatement staff members seem to accept
unquestionably a prospect's claim that the prohibited contact had no
impact on his choice of institution or that the prospect did not know
that the contact was a violation. Yet, prospects, particularly elite
ones, know, or at the very least should know, the contact rules. They
learn them from their high school coaches, NCAA recruiting
information, and coaches at NCAA institutions who follow contact
rules and seek to keep the recruiting field level.
Assume that a prohibited contact with an elite prospect takes
place and a university submits a reinstatement request. On the basis
of the report, the reinstatement staff decides that the prospect was an
innocent party in the rules-violative contact and reinstates his
eligibility. The prospect signs with the university. The recruiting,
and ultimately competitive, advantage gained will be perceived to be
high. Both the coach who engaged in the prohibited contact, and
certainly all other coaches, will believe that the rules-violative
behavior paid off big time.
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The Reinstatement Committee differs from other committees in
its exclusive focus on a student-athlete's culpability as a gauge for
whether a penalty that affects that student-athlete should be imposed.
The COT imposes scholarship reductions that limit the number of
student-athletes who may receive athletics aid, prohibits post-season
253
competition, and otherwise limits team competition opportunities.
The length of time from commission of violations to the infractions
hearing means that penalties most often affect student-athletes who
were not on the team when violations were committed. 2 4 Among
other penalties, Team CAP may reduce total team scholarships for
sub-par team academic performance. 255 A student-athlete denied a
scholarship because of such a team penalty may have a 4.0 cumulative
grade point average. In both COI and Team CAP situations, the
athletics opportunities of student-athletes are negatively affected.
Even should they transfer, their competition eligibility may be
256
adversely affected.
Deterrence is often difficult to calculate. Penalties, and the
conduct triggering them, often are not widely known or understood.
Coaches closely follow prohibited recruiting contact cases. These cases
often receive a great deal of public attention.
When a coach
intentionally has an impermissible recruiting contact with a prospect,
the prospect should be prohibited from attending the institution that
made the contact. One such decision would send shock waves through
recruiting circles and would go a long way to ending the conduct. If,
however, reinstatement decisions retain an exclusive focus on studentathlete culpability, then there needs to be a rethinking of institutional
penalties to be assessed in secondary cases and much closer scrutiny
of an athlete's claims that he did not know there was a violation and
that the violation had no effect on his decision to attend an institution,
with any modicum of doubt resolved against the prospect. Most
importantly, there must be consistency of action between
reinstatement and enforcement staffs and better coordination.

253.

INFRACTIONS REPORT No. 236, supra note 122.
254.
This approach also is true for other institutional actors. The coach who paid money
to a prospect will be long gone from an institution by the time penalties arrive that limit coach
activities in the sport.
255.
See NCAA BYLAWS art. 23.2.1.2.2 (Financial Aid, Playing and Practice Seasons and
Recruiting Limitations).
256.
NCAA BYLAWS art. 14.5 (Transfer Regulations).
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1. Standard Form
One way to establish consistency of action, and also to achieve
a better basis for decision, is the use of a standard
reinstatement/secondary report form for submission with all
reinstatement requests and secondary violation reports. Both the
Reinstatement Committee and the secondary enforcement staff rely on
institutional submissions, reinstatement fully and secondary
enforcement predominantly. Both staffs should work together to
determine what information should be provided. Use of a standard
form not only would assist in consistency of action and approach, but
it also would ameliorate the negative consequences of relying on
institutions for information on which decisions are made. Universities
often submit reinstatement requests or secondary self-reports that do
not provide full information as to the circumstances, fail to disclose
conflicts in the underlying information, or omit the names of those
who were interviewed. The form should elicit at least the following:
1. A list of all individuals known or reasonably believed to have information regarding a
violation, together with information as to which of these individuals was interviewed,
and by whom.
2. An identification of any disagreements between and among those interviewed with
regard to the circumstances of a violation, together with a summary of the conflicting
positions and an explanation of how the institution decided which version to believe.
3. Where there is both student and staff member involvement, a statement of the
comparative responsibilities of the student-athlete and staff member and an explanation
of how that conclusion was reached.
4. A list of all prior violations the coach or individual committing the current violation
has committed in the same general category as the current violation and whether it
occurred at the submitting institution or at another NCAA member institution (together
with a signed attestation from the individual whose violation it is as to the completeness
and accuracy of the list).
5. A list of all prior violations that the coach or individual committing the current
violation has committed over the prior five years at the submitting institution or at
another NCAA member institution (together with a signed attestation from the
individual whose violation it is as to the completeness and accuracy of the list).
6. A list of all prior similar violations that staff members of the team or athletics
program have committed.
7. A signed written statement by each individual involved in a violation describing the
circumstances of its commission.
8. A signed attestation by the compliance staff member responsible for the investigation
and factual conclusions that the investigation was thorough and that the report contains
no known material factual omissions or misstatements.
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2. Reporting Line
A second, more fundamental, reform would return the
reinstatement staff reporting line to the Division I Vice President for
Enforcement from its more recent placement under the Vice President
for Membership Affairs. Although reinstatement staff currently have
authority to ask for additional information or to clarify information
submitted, 257 their placement in enforcement could assure they are
better trained to spot potential problems, identify what follow-up is
needed, and avoid myopia caused by an exclusive focus on studentathlete culpability. Return of reinstatement to enforcement would
enhance needed consistency between the reinstatement and
enforcement/infractions processes regarding the gravity of violations
and their treatment.
Reinstatement decisions can generate a great deal of publicity.
Often, they are attributed to the COI, which, in turn, means criticism
of the COI for perceived leniency or for being biased against certain
institutions or arbitrary in its treatment of like cases. This generates
much negative publicity about the inconsistency of "NCAA" treatment
of violations. The NCAA likely will never be regarded favorably, but
everything that reasonably can be done to correct misimpressions
should be done; a positive image is a critical prior step to public
support.
3. Reinstatement and AGA
Both reinstatement and AGA staffs deal with student-athlete
and prospect violations.
AGA staff members are trained in
investigations. Training apart, AGA staff members often have direct
contact and interaction with individuals who are providing
information and are therefore well situated to assess these
individuals' credibility. They also may have information additional to,
or even different from, that which an institution provides, as well as
"behind the scenes" information about the general recruiting scene in
particular sports. Finally, AGA staff members have a perspective that
extends beyond what officially is provided in a reinstatement request.
Jurisdictional separation of reinstatement and enforcement,
including AGA, does not require turning a blind eye to the best
evidence of student-athlete culpability.
In reinstatement cases

257.
Reinstatement staff also make no independent decision that a violation occurred;
that, too, is the responsibility of the institution. NCAA BYLAWS art. 14.12. 1.
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involving AGA violations, reinstatement staff routinely should consult
with AGA staff and rely on their conclusions as to the likelihood of
prospect knowledge. Conversely, AGA staff should ascertain from the
reinstatement staff the information that would assist it in evaluating
a case, the questions it would like answered, and the documents the
reinstatement staff would like acquired.
Even a continued focus on student-athlete interests, moreover,
does not mean that the Reinstatement Committee must purposefully
avoid information that bears on competitive equity. Time-sensitive
reinstatement decisions may limit how much AGA fact-finding can
assist reinstatement staff. Where there is doubt as to student-athlete
culpability, however, that doubt should be resolved before a studentathlete is made competition-eligible.
Moreover, AGA staff works
under time constraints that require AGA staff time to conclude an
investigation, on average, in three months; 2 8 some cases are resolved
in twenty-four hours. 259 Even if an AGA case is not fully resolved,
AGA staff may still have information weighing on student-athlete
eligibility or on the credibility of particular individuals. In a close
working relationship with reinstatement staff, AGA staff might
structure their investigations to acquire the information most critical
to a reinstatement decision ahead of other information. In any event,
many reinstatement cases are not time sensitive. A student-athlete's
competition season may be over, he may be injured, or he may have
academic eligibility issues with which to deal.
4. What Price for Non-Transparency?
Yet another factor that affects the credibility and functioning of
reinstatement staff and the Reinstatement Committee relates to how
penalties are administered. The Reinstatement Committee delegates
to reinstatement staff the initial responsibility to evaluate and impose
penalties in reinstatement cases consistent with committee guidelines.
Under current practice, reinstatement staff may depart upward or
downward from the penalty guidelines. For departures upward there
is a party-the member institution-that may appeal to the
Reinstatement Committee. Here, transparency is assured and the
Reinstatement
Committee
determines when exceptions
are
258.
Average time determination is based on the enforcement staff case management
major case tracking system. The database has been up and running for two years and includes
all AGA and major cases handed in that period. Telephone Interview with Rachel NewmanBaker, AGA Director (June 27, 2009).
259.
See id.
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warranted. Departures downward, however, inure to the benefit of
the member institution.
Here, no appeal is taken, and the
Reinstatement staff decision is only reviewed after the fact. If the
Reinstatement Committee disagrees with a downward departure, then
the particular decision is archived and the staff will not again depart
from guidelines in this particular way. The decision in the case now
archived remains unchanged, however. The result is that a particular
institution and student-athlete not only received a deal not sanctioned
by policy but are also the only ones to benefit from such a deal. This is
a failure of transparency that breeds distrust.
Reinstatement of student-athletes to eligibility can have an
obvious impact on team competitive success. Institutions are deeply
concerned that their athletes be treated fairly on the facts of their own
situation and also equally with student-athletes at other institutions.
Reinstatement decisions often involve high-profile athletes or highprofile situations. There is critical need for transparency to promote
confidence among member institutions that reinstatement cases are
treated similarly. Equally, there is critical need for representatives of
member institutions, and not NCAA staff, to set policy.
For all of these reasons, reinstatement staff should not have
authority to depart downward from guidelines. If the staff believes a
downward
departure is warranted, it
should make that
recommendation, together with reasons and information regarding
like cases, to the Reinstatement Committee.
D. Improving the InterpretationsProcess
The requisites of institutional control, combined with a large,
complex body of bylaws to be administered, make clear the need for an
NCAA interpretations process to assist campus compliance directors.
Bureaucracy begets bureaucracy, however. An accessible staff and
committee structure trigger increased requests for interpretations. A
regularized interpretation system leads to a comfort level with
interpretations. In any interpretative process, there is a line between
reasonable interpretation of legislative language and that which
effectively amends the language. It is a fine line, and there may be
disagreement when it is reached and crossed, but the line is there. In
the NCAA system, with broadly described need for interpretations, the
comfort level with the process inclines toward interpretations more
likely to cross the line into legislation.
NCAA bylaws are adopted by a formal and regularized process
intended to promote full discussion of competing interests before
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legislation is adopted. The process may not be pretty, but it produces
member "buy-in" important to an association that depends on member
cooperation. The issue is not that staff and Legislative Interpretation
Committee interpretations
are unreasonable
assessments of
legislative intent that fail to pay heed to the intended scope of a
bylaw. Instead, the issue is that, on occasion, they do so only by
stretching and straining bylaw language to accommodate intent, often
in a context not anticipated by the original drafters or in relation to
bylaws adopted later for different purposes.
Courts owe deference to duly adopted NCAA bylaws. 2 60 The
process of duly adopting bylaws encompasses the authority of the
Legislative
Interpretation
Committee.
If the
Legislative
Interpretation Committee interprets bylaws so broadly as not to be
encompassed within a reasonable reading of bylaw language, in a real
sense it is accurate to say that such interpretations are effectively
sanctioned by NCAA member institutions and consistent with the
mutual obligations they owe one another.
Nonetheless, such
interpretations give rise to absence of adequate notice arguments by
coaches, student-athletes, and others cited for conduct whose
characterization as rules-violative is dependent on an interpretation,
as well as claims that violations were inadvertent. Interpretations not
reasonably embodied in the plain language of a bylaw and that
materially change that plain language pose implementation problems
for the COI and increase the potential for litigation. 6 1 They are
asking for trouble, therefore, despite the fact that they fall within the
contemplated scheme of NCAA governance and the fact that judicial
deference is due that scheme.
The Legislative Council has control and oversight to assure
interpretations are appropriately cabined.
Currently, Legislative
Interpretation Committee interpretations are presented to it as action
items in a committee report. Unless a member institution alerts a
Council member to potential problems with an interpretation, it will
be approved with little or no discussion.2 62 The process is efficient, as

260.
261.
262.

See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
See, e.g., INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 265, supra note 67.
On occasion, interpretations have been reversed by the Division I Management

Council. Compare, e.g., NCAA DIV. I MGMT. COUNCIL, OFFICIAL INTERPRETATION: SIX CREDITHOURS REQUIREMENT FOR A GRADUATE STUDENT-ATHLETE (I) (Apr. 17, 2007) (revising an

interpretation of NCAA BYLAwS arts. 14.4.3.1(c), 14.4.3.5(c)), with Letter from Josephine (Jo) R.
Potuto, Richard H. Larson Professor of Constitutional Law and NCAA Faculty Athletics
Representative, Univ. of Neb.-Lincoln, to Leeland Zeller, Assoc. Dir. of Membership Servs.,
NCAA (Mar. 1, 2007) (on file with author) (requesting rescission of an official interpretation of
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it is only the unusual case in which an interpretation strays too far.
Nonetheless, in this area, efficiency should give way to a more careful
and regularized process of oversight. Interpretations should be widely
and effectively disseminated to member institutions and conferences
in advance of a Legislative Council meeting so that all members have
a realistic opportunity to review interpretations in advance of their
formal adoption. In addition, the Legislative Council should appoint a
subcommittee to review and report on interpretations before formal
approval.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Division I manual sets forth a complex and interrelated
body of conduct bylaws adopted by member institutions pursuant to
which they choose to be governed. Other bylaws create committees
with operational authority to administer conduct bylaws and cover the
processes for adopting, interpreting, and enforcing them and granting
waivers from their operation. NCAA governance in general and the
legislative interpretation, student-athlete reinstatement, enforcement,
and infractions processes in particular are well conceived to do the
work of the NCAA. They are easily explained and easily understood
with reference to parallel processes in the greater legal world. That
judicial deference is the operative rule of law for private associations
such as the NCAA is clear. That NCAA processes on the merits
deserve such deference equally is clear.

NCAA BYLAWS art. 14.4.3.5(c)). The interpretation had been approved by the Legislative
Interpretation Committee and previously had been approved by the Management Council.

